Sejarah Asia Tenggara 1
MASUKNYA IMPREALISME BARAT DI ASIA TENGGARA
1. Jaman Penjelajahan Bangsa Barat
Di antara para penjelajah Barat di Asia Tenggara adalah sebagai berikut:
a. Ordonico dari pardenone (1316-1330)
Ia berangkat dari Eropa tahun 1316 dan kembali tahun 1330. perjalananya melalui pantai Koromandel Sumatera, Jawa, Kalimantan, Champa dan kemudian Kanton. Karangannya berjudul “Description Of The East”. Isinya memberikan tentang kejelasan tentang apa yang telah ditengkan oleh Marco Polo. Ia menyebut Sumatera, juga Lamori. Ia juga menyebut-nyebut adapt perkawinan dan kanibalisme penduduk. Mungkin ada benarnya karena menurut Ibn batutah masih ada manusia makan manusia. Tentang Jawa antara lain diterangkannya ada seorang raja besar memerintah 7 (tujuh) orang raja kecil yang bersemayam di istana yang permai.
b. Yordanus dari Itali
Yordanus adalah seorang pendeta. Ia mengisahkan perjalanannya ke India dengan judul “The Wonder Of The East”. Diterangkan tentang penduduk yang menghasilkan rempah-rempah di Jawa, Sumetera dan Champa sekitar tahun 1330.
c. John Marignolli dari Florence
Ia seorang pendeta dari kota Florence, Itali. Melalui jalan darat ia mengembara sampai ke Cina (1342), kemudian kembali melalui perairan Asia Tenggara. Ia menceriakan tentang sabah yang dikuasai keum wanita. Ratu Sabah pernah memberi jamuan makan padanya. Buku nya diberi judul “AnnalsOf Bohemian”.
d. Nicolo de Conti dari Venezia (1420-1440)
Seorang pedagang dari Venezia. Ia mengembara ke timur selama 25 tahun (1420-1440). Ia melaawat ke Sumatera, jawa, Tenaserim (Birma Selatan) Arakan (daerah muslim di Birma), ia kembali ke Venezia melalui laut Merah, Kairo, Laut Tengah dan Venetia. Demi keselamatannya ia mengaku beragama Islam. Kisah perjalannya dicatat oleh Poegio Braciolini 9sekretaris paus Euginius). Dalam catatannya itu ia menyebut-nyebut tentang Sumatera yang menurut pendapatnya penduduk menyebutnya “Sciamutera”. Daerahnya menghasilkan kapur barus, rempah-rempah dan emas. Orangnya masih kanibal. Ia juga menyebut tentang Andamaia, tanah Serim, Arakan dan Ava (Myanmar). Tentang Jawa hanya menyebut bahwa penduduknya suka menyambung ayam.
e. Hierenimo de Sano Stefano dari Genoa (1496)
Seorng pedagang dari Genoa 9italia0. ia berangkat tahun 1496. ia berlayar ke Malaka, kemudian terhanyut ke sumatera. Ia mencatat bahwa barang yang diperdaganggkan di sana (sutera, lada hitam, cabe, kemenyan, cendanaputih) dari Sumatera ia ke cambay di Gujarat.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 2
f. Ludiviko de varthema dari bologna (1502)
Ia seorang pengembara dari Bologna (Italia) tahun 1502 ke Asia tengah melalui Mesir, Syria, Arab, Persia dan India. Dengan mengaku beragama Islam ia berhasil mengunjungi Mekkah. Dalam catatannya ia memperkenalkan “Malaka” sebagai “Bandar rempah-rempah besar”, yang penduduknya kebanyakan “Giavia” (Java). Menurutnya orang-orang Asia Tenggara pada waktu itu sudah pandai membuat mesiu danmenggunakannya ketika berperang dengan Portugis. Varthema juga melawat ke Banda, Maluku dan Kalimantan. Dan dari catatannya kemudian diterjemahkan kedalam berbagai bahasa. Dengan demikian mulailah masuk perdagangan dari Eropa pertama ke Asia tenggara. Ia merupakan orang eropa pertama yang berhasil mengunjungi tempat suci Islam.
2. Imprealisme Barat di Asia tenggara
a. Portugis
Sebab-sebab kedatangan bangsa Portugis :
1. Recnquesta, semangat untuk menaklukan bangsa yang dulu pernah menaklukan mereka, dlam hal ini orang-orang Islam.
2. Dengan jatuhnya Konstantinopel ketangan Turki (1453). Maka perdaganggkan antara Lisabon dengan kawasan Laut Tengah terputus. Oleh karena itu mereka terpaksa hrus mencari jalan sendiri ke Timur, khususnya ke Indonesia dalam rangka mencari rempah rempah.
3. Berlangsungnya Renaissance (tahun 1500-an) menimbulkan perubahan besar di Eropa. Renaissance depat irtikan sebagai “lahir kembali kebudayaan Romawi dan Yunani “. Tetapi di dalam arti luas Renaissance dapat diartikan sebagai “lahirnya kembali jiwa dan semangat Eropa yang bebas”.kebebasan mencari dan mengembangkan ilmu pengetahuan. Ada perubahan mental yang besar pengaruhnya bagi bangsa Eropa, yang menumbuhkan semangat kepeloporan, penjajahan, termasuk penjelajahan mencari daerah-daerah baru diluar Eropa.
4. perkembnagan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi pada waktu itu meghasilkan penemuan-penemuanbaru yang mendorong mereka untuk melakukan semangat penjajahan diantaranya: mengguanakan mesiu, peta bumi, kompas dan sarana pelayaran yang lebih baik sehingga mampu melakukan pelayaran keseluruh dunia. Orang Perancis mampu meluaskan daerah kekuasaannya, meskipun harus berhadapan dengan orang Islam di Timur.
Pemimpin kekuasaan Portugis adalah Francisco De Almeida, berhasil menguasai perdangangan perdagangan di pantai Malabar. Tetapi ia menolak meluaskan ekspansinya ke Malaka. Kemudian diteruskan oleh Alfonso d‟ Albuquerque. Ia juga menaklukan Goa (1510), Malaka (1511). Tindakan ini merupakan strategi Portugis yang penting di Asia Tenggara.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 3
Dari Malaka Portugis, mengirimkan dutanya ke Myanmar dan Siam. Kemudian dari Myanmar juga ia mengirimkan Angkatan Bersenjata ke Maluku di bawah Antonio d”Abreu (1512). Sebetulnya Portugis telah mendapatkan hubungan dagang yang menguntungkan dengan Ternate, Tidore, dan Halmahera. Mereka melaksanakan politik MONOPOLI PERDAGANGAN, sehingga timbul perlawanan dari penguasa setempat. Tahun 1522 portugis mencoba berhubungan dengan ratu Padjajaran melalui pelabuhan Sunda kelapa untuk membendung kekuasaan Islam. Upaya tersebut dialihkan ke Blambangan, akan tetapi mengalami kegagalan. Karena kesombongan Portugis sendiri, penyebaran agama Katolik yang dipimpin oleh Franciscus Xaverius, mengalami kegagalan. Perselisihan antara Portugis dan Ternate menyebabkan timbulnya perangantara keduanya pada tahun 1570-1575. pada akhir abad ke-16 tercatat ada seorang tokoh pengeliling dunia dari Inggris bernama Francis Drake. Ia berhubungan dengan Sultan Baabulah yang memberikan peluang kepada Inggris untuk mengadakan hubungan baik dengan Ternate. Tetapi pemerintahan Inggris di London belum menunjukkan adanya perhatian untuk menjalin kerjasama dengan Ternate. Hamper di seluruh Asia tenggara, Portugis terlibat peperangan dengan penguasa setempat. Dengan Myanmar dan Arakan pernah terjadi perebutan kekuasaan. Pada abad XVI, seorang Portugis Goncalves Tipao , menyatakan dirinya raja di pulau Sanwich, sebelah timur Gangga, tempat berlangsungnya para perompak Portugis. Keganasan mereka sampai penguasa Benggala, Sayista Khan, menghancurkan serangan perompak tersebut. Menurut Sir Thomas Roe, seorang utusan Inggris di Moghul, kejatuhan Portugis di Asia tenggara disebabkan oleh hal-hal berikut:
1. Portugis terlalu mengandalkan kekuatan perangnya. Sehingga terjadi peperangan di mana-man dan hal ini menumbuhkan banyak biaya.
2. mereka dating sebagai penakluk sehingga menimbulkan permusuhan dan kebencian di kalangan bangsa-bangsa di Asia Tenggara.
3. disamping itu sering terjadi kericuhan intern, para pemimpinnya sering terlibat dalam perebutan kekuasaan dan pengaruh demi kepentingan pribadinya masing-masing. Mereka tidak berdisiplin dalam tugasnya.
Sementara itu Belanda dan Inggris telah banyak mendapatkan kemajuan dalam pengembangan angkatan lautnya, sehingga mampu menyaingi armada Portugis dan Spanyol pda akhir abad ke-16.
b. Spanyol
Orang Spanyol pertama „menemukan‟ Filipina adalah Ferdinad de Magelhaens dalam rangka perjalanan keliling dunia (1519-1521/22). Ia berangkat pada tahun 1519. Magelhaens adalah seorang Portugis yang berada dalam dinas Spanyol. Dalam perjalanannya itu, ia sampai di Cebu (1521). Di sana ia terlibat dalam perselisihan dengan penduduk asli karena ikut campur tangan dalam pertikaian intern di Cebu, ia terbunuh.perjalanan keliling dunia dilanjutkan oleh Sebastian del Cano. Pada tahun 1522 ia sampai kembali ketanah airnya.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 4
Pada tahun 1521, ketika orang Portugis dan Spanyol bertemu di Maluku, timbul perselisihan antara keduanya. Spanyol dan Portugis saling menuduh, bahwa lawannya melangar isi perjanjian Tordessilas(1494). Perselisihan ini kemudian dapat diakhiri dengan ditandatanganni Perjanjian Saragosa (1529), yang menentukan batas timur antara Wilayah kekuasaan Portugis dan Spanyol yaitu garis meridian yang melalui kepulauan Jailolo. Namun demikian, Spanyol tetap mengklaim bahwa daerah kepulauan (Filipina sekarang) adalah wilayah kekuasaannya karena merekalah yang pertama kali menemukannya. Mereka berusaha menduduki daerah itu. Pada tahun1542 Ruy Lopez de Villalobos berangkat deri Meksiko untuk menaklukan daerah tersebut. Dialah yang memberikan nama “Philippines‟ sebagai penghormatan kepada Raja Spanyol Philip II. Ekspedisi kedua dikirim pada tahun 1562 di bawah pimpinan Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. Berangkat dari Meksiko dengan pasukannya yang kuat. Perang berlangsung antara tahun 1565-1572, perang ini berakhir dengan penaklukan tiga kerajaan Islam yang belum lama didirikan di Manila yaitu raja Sulaiman, raja matada dan raja lakandula. Raja Matarda dan raja Lakandula lebih dulu tunduk kepada Spanyol dan kemudian memeluk agama Kristen, sedangkan raja Sulaiman malawan sampai gugur. Tujuan penjelajahan Spanyol di Filipina:
1. ingin menguasai perdagangan rempah-rempah
2. ingin mengadakan hubjungan dengan Cina dan Jepang dalam rangka menjalin hubungan dagang yang lebih luas.
3. menyebarkan agama Nasrani
Dari tujuan tersebut hanya tujuan yang ketiga yang dapat dicapai, hal ini disebabkan oleh hal-hal berikut:
a. Filipina tidak menghasilkan rempah-rempah, hanya menjadi Bandar transito. Spanyol berusaha untuk menutupi kekurangan ini dengan mencoba mengeksploitasi emas dan ternyata kawasan ini juga tidak menghsilkan emas, akhirnya Spanyol berusaha meningkatkan posisi Manila sebagai Bandar transito yang penting di Asia Tenggara. Namun ketika Inggris membangun Hongkong (1842) kedudukan Manila sebagai Bandar transito jatuh.
b. Upaya Spanyol untuk menjalin hubungan dagang dengan Jepang dan Cina gagal karena keduanya menjalankan isolasi.
c. Tujuan yang ketiga ini yang tercapai. Penyebaran agama katolik di Filipina paling berhasil dibandingkan dengan penyebaran agama katolik dibagian Asia Tenggara lainnya. Mungkin disebabkan penyebaran agama Islam di Filipina sebelah Utara belum meluas. Benyak diantara penduduk asli menganut animisme dan dinamisme. Perlu diketahu bahwa penyebaran agama Kristen di Filipina pada waktu itu tidak dilaksanakan secara intensip akibatnya agamanya.
Pada awal penjajahan Spanyol di Filipina satu-satunya lembaga kehidupan masyarakat yang ada yaitu “barangai”, yaitu kumpulan keluarga dalam lingkungan pengaturan kehidupan Masyarakat yang bersifat local. Selanjutnya pada masa penjajahan spanyol Barangai dijadikan sebagai unit pemerintahan local dibawah “cabeza”. Pemimpin cabeza ini turun-temurun deangan hak-hak
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 5
istimewa. Ia bertanggungjawab atas pajak dan pelaksanaan pemerintahan pada umumny. Diatsa cabeza ada “Pueblo” khususnya Bandar-bandar pelabuhan yang diperintah oleh Gobernadorcillo yang dipanggil capitan. Capitan dipilih secara demokratis di kalangan orang-orang Spanyol. Disamping itu dibentuk pula badan perbendaharaaan rakyat yang disebut Caja de Comunidad. Badan ini kedudukannya kauat karenadilindungi oleh “Audencia” (dewan rakyat di Spanyol) tugasnya menghadapi dan mengatasi kesulitan-kesiulitan ekonomi). Dalam pelaksanaan pemerintahan pada umumnya Filipina dikuasai oleh dua bentuk pemerintahan yaitu:
a. Pemerintahan Sipil, yang dipimpin oleh Guberbur Jendral, dan
b. pemerintahan Gereja yang dipimpin oleh seoarang Uskup
Kedua pemerintahan tersebut mempunyaikedudukan yang seimbang . dalam hal-hal tertentu pemerintahan gereja lebih besar pengaruhnya (mengapa?). Pada waktu Spanyol menghadapi perang Delapan Puluh tahun (1468-1648) melawan Belanda, akibatnya terasa di Filipina belanda mengancam kedudukan Spanyol di Filipina. Untuk membiayai peperangan ini pemerintahan jajahan Spanyol di Filipina memaksakan system penindasan sebagai berikut:
a. pelaksanaan system „Polo”, semua orang , kecuali pembesar dan anak sulung harus bersedia menjadi buruh , pekerjaaanya cukup berat , gaji jarang di bayar. Kepadanya hanya diberikan beras untuk menyambung hidup.
b. System “Vancala”, semua orang Filipina (Petani) dipaksa menjuan hasil buminya kepada pemerintah yang membayarnya dengan surat perjanjian utang dari pemerintah. System ini sangat menindas kehidupan petani.
c. Perancis
Bersamaan dengan tertanamnya pengaruh Belanda di kepulauan Nusantara saudagar Perancis mencoba membuka perdagangan dengan Asia Tenggara. Pada tahun 1601 sebuah ekspedisi mendarat di banten, pada tahun 1603 maskapai dgang Hindia Timur didirikan di Paris. Bengsa Belanda berhasil Manahan masuknya Portugis dan Inggris. Menghadapi Hindia Timur Perancis kemudian terhenti kegiatannya. Perdagangan Perancis kemudian diselenggarakan terbatas kepada perdagangan individual, mereka mengunjungi Sulawesi dan Sumatera. Selanjutnya minat Perancis ke Asia ke Asia tenggara silanjutkan oleh misionaris gereja roma katolik. Pada tahun 1615 biarawan Jesuit menjalankan misinya di Fai Fo, sebelalah selatan dari Tourane. Keberhasilannya menyebabkan pengiriman ke Tongkin pada tahun 1627 seorang biarawan bernama Alexandre de Rhodes yang dikenal tidak hany sebagai misionaris yang berhasil tetapi juga metodanya untuk menulis bahas Vietnam kedalam tulisan latin menggantikan tulisan Cina.
Alexandre de Rhodes pergi ke Eropa untuk mencari bantuan dan Usaha yang giat ini menghasilkan terbentuknya “The Frenc Society Of Foreign Mission”. Pada tahun 1662 sejumlan biarawan Perancis dikirim, and tiba di Ayuthya dengan niat masuk Vietnam, tetapi kemudian mereka tinggal di sana.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 6
Laporan Alexandre de Rhodes mengenai kondisi Asia Tenggara juga membangkitkan harapan bagi pedagang Perancis dan perluasan kekuasaan politik Perancis, dandalam tahun 1664 maskapai dagang Hindia Timur perancis dihidupkan kembali. Pada waktu itu bangsa Belanda telah memiliki penngaruh besar dalam perdagangan luar negeri dan posisi yang kuat mereka mendapatkan kesiap-siagaan mengunakan kekerasan jika mereka tidak memperoleh kesempatan berdagang, hal ini memaksa Raja Narai (1657-1688) untuk bekerja sama. Maskapai Hindi Timur milik Inggris, tidak ada maksud untuk campur tangan disana, tetapi Perancis ingindan dapat membantu kalangan Minoritas membangkitkan minat pemerintah perancis dalam masalah Ayuthya, dan sebuah surat dikirimkan kepada raja Narai, untuk membina persahabatan dengan Ayuthia pengaruh Perancis tertanam berkat sikap persahabatan dari seorang yunani bernama ConstanPhaulkon, yang menjadi penasihat perdagangan luar neger Ayuthya. Pada tahun 1680 sebauh putusan dikirimkan dari Ayuthya ke Perancis. Tetapi kapal yang mengangkut tenggelam di Madagaskar, pada tahun 1683 perwakilan perancis dibuka di Ayuthya (untuk perdagngan). Perurusan Perancis dibuka di Ayuthya pada tahun 1685. akibatnya maskapai perdagangan hindia Timur milik Perancis memperoleh konsensi perdagangan yang besar dan diberi hak-hak untuk membentuk pesukan tetap, berkedudukan dipelabuhan Songkhla sebagai perisai untuk mempertahankandiri dari ancaman Belanda. Kalangan misionaris berharap agar kehadiran pasukan Perancis di Ayuthya memberi fasilitas bagi penyiaran agama Katolik disana. Posisi belanda dibuat lebih sukar lagi oleh pahaulkon, pada tahun 1686 mereka menutup perdagangan di Ayuthya, meninggalkannya untuk Perancis. Phaulkon kemudian bergabung lebih erat dengan Perancis. Ketika pasukan Perancis tiba pada tahun 1687 dia mengizinkan untuk menduduki Mergui di pantai Tenasarim. Dengan ini Perancis dapat mengawasi route Ayuthya dan juga perdagangan di darat dari Samudra Hindia ke melalui ke Tenaserim. Kekuatan yang digerakan oleh Phaulkon dan kehadiran pasukan peransis menimbulkan Amarah dan kekhawatiran keluarga Bangsawan Thai. Ketika dalam tahun tahun 1588 raja narai jatuh sakit, sepasukan anti asing menahan Phaulkon dan Perancis terpaksa harus meninggalkan Negara. Demikianlah usaha mencoba menguasai Ayuthya gagal. Belanda memperoleh kembali hubungan dagannya. Tetapi sejak saat itu Thai tidak membolehkan seorang asing berkedudukan seperti Phaulkon, sampai seratus puluh tahun, barulah orang eropa diterima baik di Ayuthya. Kalangan Misionaris kemudian melanjutkan kegiatannya di Asia tenggara terutama di Cochim China. Pada pertengahanabad 18 mereka berhasil mendirikan masyarakat Romakatolik disana beranggotakan 300.000 orang. Persaingan antara para biarwan terutama antara orde Jesuit dengan orde lainnya, pada tahun 1738 paus Clement XII mengadakan pembgian wilayah masing-masing. Orde Jesuit diberi daerah Tongking dan daerah-daerah utara Annam. Sedangkan rahib-rahib Perancis yang tergabung dalam Societe des Mission Entrangeres kawasan Hue ke selatan.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 7
Seorang rahibn perancis bernama Pierre Joseph Georges Pigneau yang berjasa menolong Nguyen Ahn dari ancaman srangan tay Son bersaudara pda tahun 1777. pendetq itu mulai bertugas di Kochin Cina pada tahun 1765. Perancis membantu Nguyen Ahn untuk merebut kekuasaan dari tangan Tayson bersaudara. Pada tahun 1802, nguyen Ahn dapat merebut kembali kekuasaan atas Annam dengan bentuan perancis. Nguyen Ahn memproklemasikan dirinya sebagai kaisar Gia Long dan Annam disebutnya sebagai kerjaan Vietnam (kerjaan Selatan). Bersamaan dengan itu masuk pula imprealisme Perancis disana. Mula-mula Gia long memberikan keleluasaan bergerak kepada misionaris Perancis di Vietnam. Pengganti-penggantinya bersikap curiga terhadap perkembngan agama roma khatolik, seperti Minh Amng (1820-1840), Thieu Tri (1840-1847) dan Tuc Duc (1847-1883) semuanya anti Roma Katolik dan menindasnya. Justru karena karena penaindasan inilah memberi alasan kepada PErancis untuk menyerbu Indo Cina, ini terjadi dimasa Tu Duc (pada masa Gia Long, Vietnam beruntung dapat bebas dari incaran imprealisme barat karena sedang berkobar perang Napoleon) Pada masa Tu Duc agama katolik ditindasnya dan inni memberi alsan kepda peancis untuk menyerbu CochinCina dan pada tahun 1858 dengan alas an melindungi warganegaranya. Ketika menyerbu Hue tentara Perancis dikalahkan (1858-1862). Pada tahun 1862 ditandatangani perdamaian Saigon. Isinya:
1. Cochin Cina timur diserahkan kepda Perancis
2. Tourane, balat, Kuang An dibuka untuk Perancis
3. kebebasan agama roma katolik
Setelah itu perancis (Admiral de la Grandiere menggunjungi raja Norodom dari Kemboja untuk menawarkan Protektorate Perancis atas Kamboja. Pada waktu itu Kamboja harus membayar upeti kepda tu Duc dan Mongkut dari Siam. Tawaran Perancis diterima. Hal ini menimbulkan sengketa dengan Siam. Pada tahun 1867 perselisihan ini dapat diselesaikan dengan diaadakan perjanjian antara Siam dengan Perancis. Siam menuntut agar Kamboja tidak digabungkan dengan Cochin Cina. Sedangkan Siam mendapatkan btambang dan Siemreap (Angkor). Dengan pengluasan daerah ini Perancis berhasil menaklukan Indo cina Selatan, tinggal lagi Vietnam dan Laos. Pada tahun 1870 kegiatan Perancis ditumpahkan menghadapi Rusia dan dalam keadaaan lumpuh, dikalahkan Jerman (masa Bismark). Kesempatan baik ini tidak dipergunakan oleh tu Duc untuk mengusir perancis. Malah dalam menghadapi petualangan Francisgarnier (1873-1874) mennyerbu Tongkin dan Hanoi dan kemudian dikalahkan vietnam, Perancis menawarkan penyelesaian perundingan dan Vietnam menerima perjanjian Saigon 1874 yang merugikan Vietnam (padahal Vietnam menang perang) dimana ditentukan bahwa Hanoi dikembalikan kepda Vietnam, Vietnam mengakui Cochin Cina sebagai milik Perancis dan Vietnam mengakui kebebasan bagi para penganut Katolik Roma.
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Tahap penaklukan berikutnya adalah pnaklukan yang dilakukan setelah perancis kuat kembali. Tu Duc meminta bantuan Cina dan ini dianggap melanggar perjanjian. Timbulah perang pad tahun 1883, Perancis menang dan perjanjian hue ditandatangani 1883 dimana ditentukan bahwa Vietnam mengakui lindungan Perancis atas Vietnam. Pada tahun 1887 Perancis menganggap Vietnam miliknya dan pada tahun 1893 Perancis merebut Laos. Dan seluruh Indo Cina jatuh ketangan Perancis.
d. Inggris
Perhatian inggris atas Asia Tenggara Dimuai ketika pada thun 1579 penjelajahan F. Drake singgah di Ternate. Maluku dalam perjalanan keliling dunianya. Ekspedisi lainnya dikirim kan pada akhir abad XVI dan pada ytahun 1600 EIC dibentuk untuk mengadakan hubungan dagang dengan kepulauan rempah-rempah. Pada tahun 1602 armadanya sampai Banten dan mendirikan loji (stasiun perdagangan) di sana. Pada tahun 1604 perdagangan dengan Ambon dan banda di buka. Pada tahun 1612 mereka mendirikan lojinya di Pattani sebelah selatn kerajaan Ayuthya. Pada tahun 1609 mendirikan pos perdagangan di Sukadana (Kalimantan), 1613 berdagang dengan Makasar dan pada tahun 1614 juga mendirikan loji di Jkarta. Dalam usaha perdagangan itu Inggris mendapat perlawanan kuat dari Belanda, Belanda tidak segan-segan unuk menggunakan kekerasan untuk mengusir inggris dari daerah Asia Tenggara kepulauan. Pada tahun 1619 Inggris mengadakan perjanjian perdamaian dengan Belanda yang menentukan bahwa Inggris mendapatkan kebebasan perdagangan, tetapi bangsa Belanda di Asia tenggara tidak menghormati perjanjian itu. Pada tahun 1621 mereka mengusir Inggris dari banda, pad tahun 1622 Inggris harus meninggalkan Pattani dan Ayuthya, pad tahun 1623 Belanda menuduh bahwa Inggris di Ambon berkomplot untuk menentang belanda lalu melakukan penyiksaan yang menimbulkan pembunuhan (Amboina Massacre). Pemerintah Inggris tidak mempersiapkan peperngan untuk kepantingan EIC atau cabang-cabangnya, Inggris mengundurkan diri dari Asia tenggara, walaupun masih ada kapal-kapal Inggris mesih mengadakan hubungan dengan Makassar dan Borneo, dalam ukuran kecil-kecilan. Pda tahun 1628 markas besar Inggris dipindahkan dari Jakarta ke Banten, bahkan pada tahun 1628 diusir dari Banten atas tuntutan Belanda. Pada tahun 1684 1682 Inggris mendirikan Fort York di bengkulen. Pada thun 1714 karena kesulitan alamiah, terpaksa mereka pindahkan ke tempat yang tidak berapa jauh dan mendirikan benteng baru Fort Marlborough. Tetapi Fort Marlboroug jauh dari jalan perdagangan yang ramai. Di Asia Tenggara daratan, EIC memperoleh sedikit sukses. Pos perdagangan di Ayuthya pada tahun 1661, tetapi disaingi Belanda dan kemudian Perancis. Sehingga padaakhir abad XVII mereka terpaksa mengundurkan diri dari sana. Percobaannya untuk berdagang dengan Burma juga tidak berhasil. Maskapai dagang membuka pos dagangnya di Syriam pada tahun 1647, peperangan di Eropa dengan Belanda menyebabkn Inggris terpaksa mengundurkan diri dari Syriam pad tahun 1657.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 9
Demikian juga halnya di Vietnam usaha perdagangan Inggris hanya membawa hasil yang tidak berarti. Pada tahun 1613 seorang agen perusahaan dikirim ke pelabuhan Fai Fo, tetapi ia terbunuh, ekspedisi perdagangan ke Tongking setelah itu gagal. Pada tahun 1674 loji Inggris didirikan di tongking tetapi kemudian ditutup lagi pda tahun 1697, demikian juga di Kamboja pos perdagangannya didirikan di lovenk 1654, tetapi karena invasi Vietnam, pos itu ditinggalkan pada tahun 1659. Inggris mendapat kesempatan baik untuk menanamkan kedudukannya di Burma ketika mendapatkan izin dari raja Alaungpaya mengangkat dirinya sebagai raja di Ava padd tahun 1753-1760. Inggris mendapatkan tempat tinggal di Nacrais dan Bassein. Dengan bantuan Inggris Alaungpaya berhasil menguasai seluruh Burma. Tujuan Inggris membantu Alaungpaya waktu itu adalah untuk mengkonsolidir Burma sebagai rintangan terhadap ekspansi Perancis dari Indo Cina ke barat. Tetapi raja-raja Burma pengganti Alaungpaya makin kuat kedudukannya dan tidak diperalat Inggris. Bahkan mereka menyerbu Inda meraks besar Inggris. Akibat pecahnya Burma – Inggris Perang Inggris – Burma I (1823-1826). Raja Bagyidaw (1819-1837) menyerang dan Bengal, Manipur dan Assam (1823). Burma kalah, akibatnya: Burma membayar ganti rugi perang, Arakan dan tenaserim diambil Inggris dan Ava ditempatkan residen Inggriss untuk mengawasi kepentingannya (isi perjanjian yandabu1826). Perang Burma II (1852-1853) tanpa perjanjian resmi. Tetapi setelah Burma kalah raja Kagan Min turuntahta dan digantikan oleh Mindon Min (1853-1878) jenderal Godwin menduduki Ranggooan dan Pegu. Ibu kota dipindahkan ke Mandalay (1857). Inggris menguasai sungai Irawady. Perang burma Inggris III 91885). Raja thibaww 91878-1885) berhubungan dengan Perancis di Indo Cina untukmenentang Inggris dibawah jenderal Prendergast menghancurkan perlawanan Thibaw dan menduduki Mandalay dan mengasingkan Thibaw ke India. Kerajaan Burma berakhir dan dimasukan ke jajahan Inggris dengan India. Kedudukan Inggris Di Malaya, Singapura dan Brunei Inggris mendapatkan kesempatan untuk memperluas perdagangan di Asia Tenggara dengan menduduki Pulo Condore (1702-1705), Negrais (1758)balangbangan (Kalimantan utara 1773). Pada abad XVIII adalah perang Inggris – Perancis berkobar diman-mana. Daerah pertama Semenanjung Melayu yang dipengaruhi Inggris adalah Penang. Sebabnya adalah pada tahun 1780-1784 Inggris dengan Belanda terlibat dalam Perang Laut. Untuk memperkuat kedudukannya di Asia Belanda menganggu perdagangan Inggris antara India – Cina. Pada tahun 1771 Sultan Kedah (yang meguasai Penang) berhubungan dengan Francis Light, yang bersedia menyerahkan pulau Penang kepada Inggris dengan syarat Inggris melindungi Kedah terhadap ancaman Sultan Selangor.
Pada waktu itu Inggris tidak memperhatikan tawaran itu karena belum merasakan kegunaannya. Tetapi pada tahun 1785 Inggris menerima tawaran itu
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 10
dan mengadakan perjanjian dengan Kedah yang pad waktu itu yang mengancam keselamatannya adalah Siam yang menuntut Kedah dan Perak. Dalam perjanjian itu tahun 1785 ditetapkan : Kedah memberikan penang kepada Inggris. Inggris mengganti/membayar kepada Kedah 30.000/tahun. Tetapi sejak tahun 1786 bayaran itu tidak pernah dibayar lagi. F. Light dengan pasukan kecil menduduki Penag. Kemudian Inggris mendapatkan daerah pantai Kedah sepanjang berhadapan dengan penang yang disebut Provice of Wellesley. Di singapura daerah Sultan Johor. Pada waktu itusedagberkobar perng napoleon dengan Inggris sehingga Inggris merasa berhak merebut semua jajahan Belanda ( Karena Belanda adalah sekutu Perancis). Setelah Perancis kalah belanda menerima kembali jajahannyayang direbut Inggris kecuali kaap Koloni dan Sailan. (Cony of London). Di Indonesia aainggris tetap menduduki bengkulen. Pada tahhun 1819 Raffles dan Farquhar menduduki singapura. Raffles benci Belanda yang dianggapnya mengusir Inggris dari Indonesia. Kekalahan politik ditutupi kemenanganekonomi (sebabnya?). Penguasaan Singapura oleh Inggris menimbulkan protes Belanda, Ingris tidak membenarkan Belanda dengan menyatakan bahwa keputusanpenguasaan Singapura adalah izin Sultan Johor dan ia berhak atas itu. Perbedaan pendapat kemudian diselesaikan melalui Treaty of London 91824) yang menetapkan : malakadan Singapura diserahkan kepada Inggris, Inggris menyerahkan Bengkulu(diduduki sejak 1684). Belanda tidak akan berhubungan dengan raja-raja Malaya, demikian juga halnya Inggris disebelah selatan Singapura. Sultan Johor (Sultan Husen) menyerahkan Singapura. Daerah lannya adalah Dingdings yang dikuasai Inggris (daerah Perak), Penang, Malaka, dan Singapura disebut sebagai Straits settlements, kemudian Malaka, Pov. Of Wellesley. Yang berdaulat disana adalah EIC. Pada tahun 1867 Straits Settlements ini dijadikan “Crown colony”. Siapapun yang lahir disana adalah warga ngara Inggris. Sementara itu Inggris menjadi pelindung Sultan-sultan: Johor, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Keantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Kedah Perlis. Brunaimenjadi penting kedudukannya sejak abad XV, ketika dikuasai oleh Sultan Muhammad (seorang Sultan Malaya yang pertama memeluk Islam). Daerah ini maju berkembang setelah jatuhnya malakpada tahun 1511 ke tangan Portugis. Pada permulaan abad XIX brunai kehilangan kebesarannya, merosot kembali daerahnya luas semula. Daerah sebelah timur merdeka atau jauh di bawah pengaruh Belanda. Bagian utara dan timur laut di klaim oleh Sultan Sulu, sebelah selatan Philipina. Pantai barat dalam keadaan kacau, di mana pimpinan- pimpinannya menentang kekuasaan Sultan Sulu sedangkan di daerahpantai merajalela bajak laut ayng banyak menimbulkan kerugian bagi kapal dagang. Sementara itu para bengsawan Melayu pegawai kesultanan menekan penduduk dengan mewajibkan membayar pajak yang tinggi bahkan kadang-kadang menjualnya sebagai budak belian atau menyuruh kerja paksa. Kepala suku bergabug dengan perompak. Kota Brubai dikenal sebagai tempat penjualan harta rampsan. Inilah sebab utama kemunduran Brunai. Perampokan banyak dilakukan darai Filipina terutama perompak Lanun dari Mindanao.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 11
Pada abd XVIII Eic tertarik perhatiannya kepad Kalimantan. Mksudnya adalahmemecahkan monopoli Belanda dikepulauan Nusantara dan juga untuk menjalin hubungan dagang dengan Cina. Pada waktu itu Cina membuka pelabuhan dagang satu-satunya untuk berhubungan dengan pedagang asing, yaitu melalui Canton, dan pedagang asing itu berhubungan dengan kelompok pedagang Cina bernama Cohong. Pada tahun 1762 Alexander Dariymple (EIC), mendapatkan ijin mendirikan factory 9loji) di daerah Sultan Sulu. Pada tahun 1765 Sultan Alimudin memberikan keleluasaaan lebih besar kepada EIC. Bahkan pada tahun 1769 EIC mendapatkan hak menduduki Blambangan (Kalimantan Utara). Pada tahun 1775 terjadi bentrokan antara perwakilan EIC dengan kepala Suku. Kedudukan perwakilan dipindahkan ke labuan (pantai barat Kalimantan). Walaupun hanya unuk beberapa bulan lamanya. Tahun 1802 Blambangan kembali jatuh ketangan Inggris. Sementara itu jmes Brook datang di Brunai (pada tahun 1839). Ia seorang bekas perwira tentara EIC yang kemudian minta berhenti setelah luka-luka dalam perang Burma – Inggris. Ia mengunjungi Asia Tenggaradan Cinapada tahun 1830-1831 dan berangkat lagi ke Cina tahun 1834. kemudian ia membeli sebuah kapal dan berlayar ke kepulauan untuk berdagang. Ia mendarat di Kuching pad tahun 1839 dan mendapatkan orang Serawak sedang berontak terhadap penguasa daerahnya, gubernur dari Sultan Brunei. Paman Sultan, raja Muda Hashim, calon pengganti dari sultan Brunai dikirimkan kesanaunntuk menumpas pemberontakan. Dari Serawak Brooke kemudian berlayar ke Sulawesi, kembali ke Serawaktahun 1840. hashim minta bantuan Brooke Hashin sendiri menghadapi intrique dalam istana yang menentang. Ia kembali ke Brunei dan menawarkan jabata Gubernur di serawak kepada Brooke sebagai imbalan atas bantuannya, James Brook menerima tawaran itu dan dalam beberapa bulan ini ia dapat mengakhi pemberontakan itu dan Brooke menerima kesetiaan dari orang dayak dan Melayu. Mahkota, pejabat gubernur semula mencoba meracuninya, tetapi gagal. Pada tahun 1841 james Brooke diangkat sebagai raja Serawak. Brooke berhasil mengadakanbeberapa perubahan diantaranya, pengadministrasian pemerintahan yang teratur dan peradilan, ia juga berhasil menghentikan kejahatan, memajuakan perdgangan. Dengan bantuan Angkatan laut Inggris ia berhasil mengatasi perompak. Armada Inggris membutuhkan batubara yang dihasilkan Kalimantan terutama Brunai dan Labuan. Tindakan brooke terhadap perompak banyak mnimbulkan kemarahan bangsa Melayu. Tindakan Brooke selalu disupport oleh Hashim. Pada tahun 1846, raja Muda hashim dan kebanykan keluarganya terbunuh dalam suatu pemberontakan, bahkan mencoba membunuh Brooke. Armada Inggris mampu mengalahkan pemberontak. Sultan memberikan kedaulatan penuh Brooke atas Serawak, ditambh dengan perjanjian bahwa labuan dijadikan koloni Inggris.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 12
Selanjutnya tindakan tegas terhadap perompak dilakukan. Perompak Dayak dilumpuhkan pada tahun 1849, perompak lanun terusir oleh laksamana Cochrane tahun 1856. Perluasan pengaruh inggris di Kalimantan adalah hasil usaha James dan Charles Brooke (keponakannya). Sementara itu Brunai sendiri banyak mengadakan hubungan dengan bangsa Eropa lainnya seperti USA (Claude Lee Moses. JW. Torrey), Jerman (Overbeck, seorang Austrian). Spanyol menuntut daerah sultan Sulu sebagai wilayahnya, Inggris menolak tuntutan itu dan mengakui Sulu sebagai Negara merdeka. Pada tahun 1849, brooke mengadakan perjanjian dengan Sulu. Tetapi pada waktu itu pemerintah Inggris tidak menyetujui tindakan Brooke atas perluasan pengaruh Inggris di Sulu, sehingga pada tahun 1851 Spanyol berkesempatan menanamkan pengaruhnya di Sulu. Pada tahun 1885 Inggris mengadakan perjanjian dengan spanyol yang megakhiri pendudukan spanyol atas Sulu. Pad tahun 1877 ada maskapai dagang Inggris yang beroprerasi di barat laut Kalimantan dengan ijin Brunai, timur laut Kalimantan dengan ijin Sultan Sulu dan Brunei. Pada tahun 1881 maskapai dent disebut Britisch Nort Borneo Company di bawah pengawasn pemerintah Inggris. Itulah sebabnya terdapat perjanjianInggris – spanyol mengenai Sulu pada tahun 1885 tersebut di atas. Pda tahun 18888 ditentukan bahwa daerah Brunei, Searwak dan Britisch Nort Borneo company menjadi protektorat Inggris.
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 13
DAFTAR PUSTAKA Abdulgani, Ruslan, Asia Tenggara di Tengah Raksasa Dunia, Lembaga Studi Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1978. Ahmad, Abu Thalib, Seajarah Tanah Besar Asia Tenggara, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kualalumpur, 1991 Bastin J. & Benda H.J. A History of Modern South East Asia, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1975. Hall, D.G.E, Sejarah Asia Tenggara, ( terjemahan dari “ A History of South East Asia “), Macmillan & Co., London, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1972. Kohn, Hans, Nasionalisme arti dan Sejarahnya, PT Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1961
Sejarah Asia Tenggara 14
Khoo, Gilbert, Sejarah Asia Tenggara Sejak Tahun 1500, Fajar Bakti, Petaling Jaya, 1968 Magden, Fred R. Von Der, Religion and Nasionalism in South East asia, The University Of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1968. Munajat Danusaputro, St., Astra Jaya, Binacipta, 1984. Pearn, B.R, An Introduction to History of South East Asia, Longsman Malaysia, 1968. Pluvier, J.M., South East Asia From Colonialism to Independence, Charles Granier SDN BHD, Kuala Lumpur, 1974. Steiberg, David Joel, et. Al. In Search of South East Asia, A Modern History, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971. Wolters, O.W, History, Culture and Religion in South East Asia, Perspectives, ISEAN, 1982.
(Riza Afita Surya) History, Education, Art, Social Enthusiastic
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Sejarah. Tampilkan semua postingan
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Pakistan and Seato
di Januari 14, 2012 Label: Sejarah
Pakistan and SEATO
Dr. Lubna Saif*
This paper seeks to investigate why Pakistan became a member of
South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it was not part of
South East Asia. By joining SEATO, Pakistan became an ally of the
American Power System in Cold War against Communism. This
strategic partnership strengthened non-democratic forces in Pakistan
eroding the fragile democratic institutions and established a
“constitutional dictatorship” which was used as a vehicle for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO.
Cold War and American Power System
The year 1946 is marked with the Cold War demonstrations when
Harry Truman declared that “no more recognition of communist
governments” and “I am sick of babying the Soviets”.1 Under the
influence of his advisors, especially George Marshall, Truman supported
their hard-line advice and policies against the Soviet Union. By 1947
these policies came to be known as “containment”. George Kennan
became the “father of containment” with his “long telegram” of February
22.2 Kennan’s depiction of communism as a “malignant parasite” that
had to be contained by all possible measures, became the ideological
foundation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and National Security
Act of 1947. In his inaugural address of 20 January 1949, Truman
declared four points about his “program for peace and freedom”: to
support the UN, the European Recovery Program, the collective defence
of the North Atlantic region, and a “bold new program” for technical aid
* Chairperson, Department of Pakistan Studies, Allama Iqbal Open University,
Islamabad.
1 Harry Truman to James Byrnes, 5 June 1946. Cold War Policies, Retrieved, 21
December 02. http://history.sandiego.edu. /truman46.html.
2 See, Thomas Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (New York, 1988).
78 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
to the poor nations.3 It was believed that because of his programs, “the
future of mankind would be assured in a world of justice, harmony and
peace”.4 Thus the containment was not only a policy, rather it was a way
of life. The probable fission bomb capacity of the Soviet Union greatly
intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States, which
culminated in NSC 68.5 Fearing the threat of Soviet atomic capabilities,
it was felt that the US programs and plans were dangerously inadequate
in terms of timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress towards
the attainment of the United States’ political, economic, and military
objectives. It was argued that the “continuation of …[present] trends
would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative
to the Soviet Union and its satellites…These trends lead in the direction
of isolation not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis
for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.”6 The
Europe was defeated and US became the “centre of power in the free
world”. This was reflected in the conclusion, which stated, “we must
organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a
positive program for peace which [would] frustrate the Kremlin design
for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which
the Kremlin… [would] be compelled to adjust”.7 It was believed that
without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, the free world
would have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until they
discover one day that they had sacrificed positions of vital interest.8 To
secure these “positions of vital interest”, a much more “rapid and
concerted build-up of the actual strength” of both the United States and
the other nations of the free world was suggested in the analysis. The
program envisaged “the political and economic measure with which and
the military shield behind which the free world [could] work to frustrate
the Kremlin design by the strategy of the Cold War”.9 Avoiding the
direct war with the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conceived with the
aim to frustrate “the Kremlin’s design by the steady development of the
moral and material strength by the free world and its projection into the
3 Cold War Policies. Retrieved, 21 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/20th /truman46.html.
4 Ibid.
5 Cold War Policies. Retrieved 19 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/1950s/nsc68.html.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 79
Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the
Soviet system.”10 The conclusion summarized that “by means of a rapid
and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of
the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest
the initiative from the Soviet Union”, the USA would be in a position to
“confront with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of
the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its
will”.11 It was thought that ‘such evidence [was] the only means short of
war, which eventually [might] force the Kremlin to abandon its [existing]
course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of
major importance”.12
The election of 1952 in the U.S. brought former Allied Commander
Dwight Eisenhower to the White House, who chose John Foster Dulles
as his Secretary of State. Together, Eisenhower and Dulles further
modified the Containment Doctrine as articulated in NSC-68. With
Eisenhower in office, the U.S. Defence Policy took a more offensive
“New Look”. His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “a patrician,
visceral anticommunist closely tied to the nation’s financial
establishment, was obsessed with communism’s challenge to the U.S.
corporate power in the Third World.”13 Dulles criticized the foreign
policy of Truman and argued that the policy of “containment” should be
replaced by a policy of “liberation”. Dulles considered neutrality as an
obsolete and an immoral and shortsighted conception. Alliances such as
NATO were the part of his “liberation strategy”.
Cold War, Defence Pacts and Pakistan
For American policy makers, the Cold War was in fact a real war in
which the survival of the free world was at stake and Pakistan before its
birth was destined to enter into this war. Pakistan’s proximity to the
Soviet Union and China, the emerging Communist Block and the Middle
East and Iran the centre of oil resources or “wells of power” placed it in a
very critical position on the “security map of the free world”. The key
event in the South Asian arena of Cold War competition was the signing
of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the
United States on 19 May 1954 with the major objective to build defence
establishment in Pakistan to be used to block any Soviet thrust into the
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 ‘Cold War (1953-1962)’ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 26 June
2004. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cold_war.
80 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
crucial Middle East and provide United States with valuable military
bases against Soviet Union. The Mutual Defence Agreement resulted in
Pakistan’s signing the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact also referred to as
the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO). The SEATO was
established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila
Pact), which was signed at Manila in September 1954. The SEATO
became effective on 19 February 1955 and was signed by Pakistan,
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand
and the United States. Pakistan was included in the alliance though it was
not a part of South East Asia.
By signing these Defence pacts, Pakistan became one of the first
few allies of the American Power System in its war against Communism
in an environment when most of the Third World countries were
campaigning for nationalism, social reformism and anti-imperialism and
refused to be part of the American Power System in the Cold War era.
Dulles is known in history for his efforts to “integrate the entire
noncommunist Third World into a system of mutual defence pacts,
travelling almost 500,000 miles in order to cement new alliances that
were modelled after (NATO)”.14 The emphasis on pacts was a logical
culmination of Truman-Acheson containment, which called for strong
alliance systems directed by the U.S. and collective security pacts.
Dulles, along-with most U.S. foreign policy-makers of the era, failed to
distinguish indigenous Third World social revolutionaries and
nationalists from the Soviet influence. Neutrality for Dulles was “an
obsolete, immoral and short-sighted conception”.15
In its war against Communism, Dulles found cooperative partnersgenerals
and bureaucrats who were trained by the British colonial
strategist minds believing in a concept of a security state and groomed in
a colonial tradition of “controlled democracy”. They were put in control
of affairs at the expense of the democratic institutions to steer Pakistan
towards Dulles’s collective security pacts. In April 1953 the Governor-
General destroying the notion of the cabinet government dismissed the
Prime Minister Nazimuddin to pave the way for negotiating the Mutual
Defence Agreement under an “authoritarian regime” which was
unaccountable to the people of Pakistan and backed by the army. This
authoritarian regime led by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad was
again successful in dismissing the provincial government of East
Pakistan in May 1954 when it voiced against the signing of the Mutual
14 ‘Dulles’, Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 81
Defence Agreement. An authoritarian regime under the disguise of a
democratic set up was felt necessary to influence Pakistan to join the
Defence Pacts, SEATO and Baghdad Pact, since the majority of the
parliamentarians and the people of Pakistan were not in favour of joining
these defence pacts. The fear of widespread public protest over the
question of Pakistan’s joining these defence pacts and support of Soviet
Union for any such popular movement was keeping Pakistan’s
authoritarian regime in a dilemma to publicly announce its intentions to
join any defence pact against Communism.
Pakistan’s Forced Entry into the SEATO
In the following discussion, we will examine how Pakistan was
persuaded to join SEATO. Dulles initiated the SEATO as a security
arrangement for the region of Southeast Asia. The idea was publicly
discussed in Geneva Peace Conference in May 1954 in the aftermath of
Indo-China conflict. On July 24, 1954, presenting his “Five Point
Program on South-East Asia and Europe”, Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of
State highlighted following points:
First. As an interim protection, to fill what is clearly a dangerous vacuum
in South-East Asia, there should be a prompt declaration of intention on
the part of all the free nations, including the so-called neutralist block,
against further aggression by means of external invasion or internal
penetration. Second. Simultaneously, every effort should be made to move
ahead on the longer range of hard and fast military commitments under a
South-East Asia defence pact. With all the many Asiatic powers we would
like to see join such a pact may not be willing to enter it that should not
serve as a veto on all the others.16
During the Geneva Peace Conference, the Foreign Office, London
was informed that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to
join in a pact for the defence of South-East Asia and that Burma had
refused.17 Following the Geneva Conference, the joint United Kingdom-
United States Study Group on South-East Asia agreed upon “collective
security pact and declaration of intention.”18 It was recorded that the
United States had agreed that “invitations should be issued by 7 August
for a meeting at the beginning of September to draw up a treaty”. It was
further recorded that “an approach should now be made to the Colombo
16 Extract from Pages 11288-9 of Congressional Record, 24 July 1954, Foreign Office
[henceforth FO] 371/111875, The National Archives: Public Record Office
[henceforth TNA: PRO].
17 Geneva to FO, 17 May 1954, D 1074/10, FO 371/111862, TNA: PRO.
18 FO Minute, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
82 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Powers to urge their participation in talks on the treaty”. Earlier, the State
Department informed all the U.S. embassies in Asia on 24 July 1954 that
an agreement had been reached between America and Britain to hold a
conference on Southeast Asian defence as the first step. The diplomatic
missions were also told that the British Government was assigned the
responsibility to invite the governments of Australia, New Zealand,
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of participating
in establishing a collective security agreement in South-East Asia.19 On
30 July 1954, Commonwealth Relations Office, London sent a telegram
to its high commissioners in India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa which stated that “the
Foreign Secretary [had] undertaken that invitation should be issued not
later than 7 August to the Conference to be held not later than 1st
September to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a Collective
Defence Agreement”.20 To make an immediate approach to Colombo
Powers, a telegram containing the text of a message from the Foreign
Secretary to the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon was sent
by the Commonwealth Relations Office, London on the same day. A
similar message was sent to the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia.
In the telegram the fears were expressed that the Indian reaction to the
approach was bound to be negative, therefore, it was considered
important “to ensure that Nehru’s reaction should be as favourable as
possible”. It was hoped that positive reaction from Pakistan, Ceylon and
Burma would “exercise a moderating influence on Nehru”. The
Commonwealth Relations Office was “cognizant of the difficulties vis-àvis
India, if Pakistan were to go it alone without the support of any other
Colombo Power, but there [could] be no question of our dissuading
either Pakistan or Ceylon from joining”. The Commonwealth Relations
Office conveyed to high commissioners that they were “indeed most
anxious to have the support of any Asian country or countries, other than
Siam and the Philippines that [could] be persuaded to join or to be
associated with the organization”. In his message the British Foreign
Secretary, invited the Prime Ministers of Colombo Power by informing
that:
We have long been in favour of creating a broadly based defensive
organization in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. After careful
study of this problem, our ideas have now crystallized sufficiently for me
19 Laithwaite to CRO, 23 July 1954, D 1074/271, FO 371/111873, TNA: PRO.
20 Telegram no. 334, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
Pakistan and SEATO 83
to seek your views on them, and I hope you will give them very serious
consideration.21
The Foreign Secretary in his message expressed the hope “to see the
Asian powers play a leading role in the defence of South-East Asia”.
Emphasizing the importance of the area, he was of the view that “its
peace [was] as yet so insecure, that [they felt it] vital to safeguard its
peaceful development and ensure its stability”. The purpose of the
meeting was “to consider possible measures of collective defence for
South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific in the hope of producing
agreed recommendations for consideration by the participating
governments and a draft collective defence agreement”. Three specific
subjects to be considered at the meeting were: “a) measure of military,
economic or technical assistance to countries wishing to strengthen their
resistance to external interference of any kind; b) consultation with a
view to common action, should the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area,
be endangered; c) action in the event of overt aggression”.22 The treaty
was said to be discussed with Chou En-lai in Geneva and the Chinese
were reported to be “well aware that [Anglo-American block] intende[d]
to press forward on these lines”. It was informed that “during these
discussions Chou En-lai was mainly concerned to obtain assurances
about the neutrality of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam”. It was made clear
that these countries were not going to “be the members of the proposed
organization”.23
The news that Pakistan had decided to participate in the conference
on South-East Asia defence was received with great pleasure and
considered “an excellent development”.24 Although, Pakistan had
decided to participate in the Manila Treaty Conference, she was not yet
ready to become a member of the South-East Asia Organization. The
message of Mohammad Ali Bogra stated:
My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret personal
message of 30 July. I am glad to be able to inform you that Pakistan will be
represented at the proposed meeting, which is planned for the beginning of
September to consider possible measures of collective defence for South-
East Asia and South West Asia. Our participation in the meeting does not
imply prior acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the
21 Telegram no. 335, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 FO Minute, 5 August 1954, D 1074/300, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
84 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
discussions in the meeting. Any recommendations made by the meeting
will be considered on their merits.25
On the other hand, Nehru’s reaction to the Manila Treaty
Conference as expected was very critical. Refusing to be associated with
any such proposed organization, Nehru argued that “an organization of
the kind proposed was more likely to promote mistrust and suspicion
than security”.26 He observed that “though it was called a defensive
arrangement it was by inference directed against China and was
motivated by fear about Chinese intentions”. He opined that any such
organization “would only serve to divide South and South-East Asia into
rival groups and would therefore, in his opinion largely undo much of the
great achievement of Geneva”. Nehru was seen convinced that “China
harboured no aggressive intentions” and there was no need for its
neighbours to feel threatened. This was not the view upheld by the
Anglo-American block, that professed that “China was the exponent of a
militant political philosophy to which [they] were unalterably opposed
and which by its very nature could scarcely allow weak neighbours to
develop freely along lines of their own choosing”.27 Criticizing the South
East Asian and South West Pacific Organization, Nehru asserted that “it
was far from being a collective peace system rather a military alliance”.28
Nehru warned that it would “possibly result in the formation of a
counter-military alliance”. He further argued that “the majority of Asian
countries [would] not be participating in the organization. Some would
even be strongly opposed to it, thus rendering South-East Asia a
potentially explosive theatre of the Cold War”.29
Nehru’s stand made it more essential that either Ceylon or Pakistan
should be persuaded to participate in the organization. It was more
convenient to press the authoritarian regime in Pakistan to bow before
the wishes of Dulles and his partners. In view of India’s criticism and
anticipated strong reactions from Moscow and Peking (Beijing), it was
easy for Pakistan’s pro-West leadership to offer unconditional support to
the proposed organization, a fact reflected in Mohammad Ali Bogra’s
message accepting the invitation to participate in the Manila Conference.
However, the governments of U.K. and U.S. were “anxious to secure
Pakistan’s participation or association with a South-East Asian
25 Laithwaite to CRO, 4 August 1954, D 1074/323, FO 371/ 111876, TNA: PRO.
26 Telegram No. 734, D 1074/303, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
27 Ibid.
28 Telegram No. 739, D 1074/303 (A), FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
29 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 85
Organization even if she were the only Colombo Power”.30 It appeared
that there were some serious Anglo-American differences over the
strategy and control of a South East Asia Organization. It is interesting to
note that, how both the parties were exploiting Pakistan’s association for
gaining their specific interests. After knowing that Dulles had already
invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South-
East Asia, the Foreign Office, London and the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations were keen to show that they were more
“anxious” than the U.S. for Pakistan’s association hoping that “there
would be at least one Asian country to act as a counter-weight to the
American protégées-Siam and the Philippines”.31 It was argued that
“Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either
Siam [Thailand] or the Philippines”. The Foreign Office felt “if Pakistan
were excluded, it would be widely believed that [the British], rather than
the Americans, were responsible, and there would be a repetition of the
resentment towards the United Kingdom felt at the time of the
conclusion of the agreement with Turkey”. The fear was expressed that
the United States might prefer to dominate SEATO by excluding
Colombo Powers. Therefore, Pakistan’s association was considered
essential. To make their case more convincing, the Foreign Office,
London argued “if Pakistan were to come in now it would make it easier
for other Colombo Powers to come in later, e.g., Ceylon, Burma, and if
there [was] a victory of the Masjumi (Moslem Party) in the elections next
February [in] Indonesia.”32 To convince Pakistan to participate, it was
argued that “Pakistan’s interests in East Bengal give her a direct interest
in South-East Asian security”.33 According to American analysis, the
closeness of former East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South East
Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. It was
emphasized that it would be more difficult to justify the introduction of
American military equipment into East Pakistan, if Pakistan’s security
interests were primarily directed towards the Middle East.34
It was widely believed that “Foreign Minister [of Pakistan] by
signing the instrument in Manila had gone rather further than his
30 Pakistan and S.E.A.T.O. D 1074/300 (A), 29 July 1954, FO 371/111875, TNA:
PRO.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Allen to State Department, 28 July 1954, Telegram No. 118, 310 SEATO,
NDD.842430, RG 84, Box 42, File 350-Pak.Pol., National Archives USA,
Washington D.C.
86 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Government had intended, and that there had been genuine
embarrassment between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
about something which the latter had done in order to be as cooperative
as possible with Mr. Dulles”.35 The Pakistan Ambassador was concerned
to maintain the “balance between tacit approval of South-East Asia
Treaty Organization and strict neutrality supported by fear of possible
Chinese reaction”.36 As expected, the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty provoked great criticism in Moscow and Peking.
Defending the Manila Treaty, the British Ambassador in Bangkok
observed in a press conference on 24 September 1954, that:
The propaganda attack against the treaty made by Moscow and Peking and
echoed by other communist agencies have been very violent. All have
denounced the Manila Treaty as “aggressive”. The falseness of this charge
and the fury with which it had been levelled show how effective it must
appear in communist eyes for the purpose for which it was designed,
namely the defence of South-East Asia against aggression. It should not be
forgotten that Chinese have their own treaty with the Soviet Union and
hence have no right to question whatever arrangement we may make with
our friends for our mutual defence.37
Despite the difficulties Pakistan could face over ratification of
SEATO, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was not given a sympathetic
hearing whenever he tried to explain Pakistan’s difficult position. The
minutes of such a meeting with the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence held in the Foreign Office London, reveal how the Prime
Minister’s position was humiliated rather showing an understanding
attitude for the difficult position in which Pakistan was being placed by
signing SEATO.38 It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra “haggled a
lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on the lines of
what “do we get out of it if we did become members, what about India
etc? The minutes recorded that “the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence pressed Mohammad Ali Bogra strongly on loss of prestige and
other good reasons why it would be very short sighted of Pakistan to
back down now”.39 The record further reveals that “later the Foreign
Secretary and Lord Alexander had a further discussion with Mohammad
35 The Pakistan Ambassador told the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, A
letter by the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka to (Peterson) South-East Asia
Department Foreign Office, D 1074/693, FO 371/116933, TNA: PRO.
36 Ibid.
37 Bangkok to CRO, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
38 FO Minute, 30 September 1954, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
39 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 87
Ali Bogra when the latter said that he would like to think more about this
and have another meeting after he returned from Washington”.40
Bogra’s reluctance was due to the increasing pressure from the
Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly. These members opposed
to any Defence pact, were also in the process of finalizing the future
constitution of Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly was reconvened on
14 March 1954 after a long break of four months and had resumed the
work on the finalization of the remaining clauses of the Basic Principles
Committee Report. The Governor-General, who was in control of the
central executive but was unable to extend its authority over the
Constituent Assembly, was not pleased with these developments. Once
the constitution was framed, the Governor-General’s position was about
to change and the focus of the power had to shift to the representative
forces. In July, Sir Ivor Jennings arrived in Pakistan to assist in the
drafting of the constitution on the invitation of the Assembly’s
Constitutional Drafting Committee. On 15 September, Bogra announced
in the Assembly that, “he [was] grateful to God that at long last [they
had]… crossed the last hurdle in Pakistan”.41 On 20 September, the
Assembly abolished the Public and Representative Offices
Disqualification Act (PRODA), the most powerful executive weapon,
since it was passed during Liaquat’s ministry. The next day, the
Constituent Assembly amended the Government of India Act 1935,
which prevented the Governor-General from dismissing the cabinet,
which was made responsible to the National Assembly through this
amendment. “This was the move to make the government completely
dependent upon the Assembly and to prevent the repetition of the
exercise of the Governor-General’s power of intervention”.42 According
to the fifth Amendment only members of the Assembly were to be
selected as cabinet ministers and could continue to hold only as long as
they retained the confidence of the legislature and similarly the Prime
Minister was required to be a member of the Assembly at the time of his
appointment.43 Furthermore, the cabinet was decided to be collectively
responsible to the Assembly, and would be required to resign if any one
of its members lost the confidence of the Assembly. By making these
40 Ibid.
41 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.353-65.
42 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1957), p.105.
43 XVI CAD (Con.), p.251 Government of India (5th Amendment) Act, 1954,
amending Sections 9, 10, 10A, 10 B, and 17. Pakistan Times, 22 September 1954;
Dawn, 21 September 1954.
88 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
amendments, the Assembly declared its supremacy and its objective to
ensure that “formation and working of government” should be in
accordance with the “accepted principles and conventions” of a
parliamentary system of government”.44 With the caption, “Parliament
Made Supreme Body”, Dawn stated that “the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan yesterday laid down in clear and unambiguous terms that from
that day the supreme authority in the country shall be the Parliament”.45
On 21 September, the Assembly voted its approval of the
constitution in the form of the Basic Principles Committee Report as
amended.46 Out of 40 votes polled, 27 were in favour, 11 Hindu members
voted against and none of the members from the Punjab voted on the
constitution. The Assembly then was adjourned until 27 October,
concluding what was called a “historical session”.47 In contrast, this was
seen as “veritable coup” carried out by Bengali members of the assembly
backed by ‘some have-nots” of the Muslim League.48 The British High
Commissioner observed that “one result [of the constitutional changes
was] to bring a step nearer the possibility that the Army and the higher
Civil Services…[might] one day come to the conclusion that the
politicians have made such a mess that it is necessary for non-political
forces to take over”.49 This observation was the mirror image of the
thinking of the “neo-colonial powers”, who claimed to be the champions
of democracy and protectors of the “free world” but to secure their
strategic interests found justification in promoting the non-political and
non-democratic forces at the expense of derailing the democratic process
in Pakistan. “Pakistan’s international supporters were ambivalent about
democracy too. The American Agenda was clear: a pro-Western
Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic
Pakistan were all desirable, but in that order. When democracy
threatened to remove a leadership that was less than pro-America, the
U.S. Embassy conveyed this priority to Pakistanis”.50 Supported by these
protectors of the “free world”, the Governor General ordered the police
to bar the members of the Constituent Assembly from attending the
session of the Assembly on 27 October 1954 which was called
44 Keith Callard, p.107.
45 Dawn, Karachi, 22 September 1954.
46 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.499-510, 570-72.
47 Dawn, 22 September 1954.
48 Karachi to CRO, 30 September 1954, DO35/5135, TNA: PRO.
49 Ibid.
50 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.56.
Pakistan and SEATO 89
specifically to vote on the draft constitution approved in the Assembly’s
previous session.51 The next day, the Governor General dissolved the
Constituent Assembly, and appointed a ‘semi dictatorial executive”
praised as a “cabinet of talents”, in which the Army Chief, General
Muhammad Ayub was included as the Defence Minister. “From all
accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Muhammad’s plan to
dismiss the Constituent Assembly once for all and to start again was
worked out with General Ayub’s prior knowledge. It is, moreover,
probable that without the assurance of the Army’s support, Ghulam
Muhammad might have hesitated”.52 General Ayub’s inclusion in the
cabinet was the indication to suggest that “this was no time for nonesense”
53 and that there should be no doubt left that the Army was the
negotiating power in the state construction and the real partner in
Dulles’s defence strategic plans.
“On 28 October 1954, the Assembly, which until then had been an
operating political body and had produced a new constitution, became a
‘failure’. But it was the success not the failure, which brought about its
demise.”54 The termination of parliamentary democracy was not the
result of “failure” within the Assembly or defects in the new
constitutional changes as suggested by the British High Commissioner
and campaigned by the Governor General and his associates, rather the
strategic partnership with the American Power System that promoted
authoritarianism was the real culprit. It was declared that the electorate
was bound to act foolish, as they had done in the East Pakistan election
clearly. This was so because masses were illiterate and needed further
training in democratic institutions. The assertion was until that was
accomplished there would be a need of “controlled democracy”.
Governor General’s action of dissolving the Constituent Assembly got
the judicial legitimacy by the Federal Court’s theory of “Law of
Necessity” declaring “that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity
makes lawful”.55 The effect of this theory was that those in command of
coercive powers of the state had the right to suspend constitutional
government when and for however long they thought necessary. The
subsequent courts in Pakistan have retroactively cited the theory of Law
51 Ibid, p.60.
52 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p.41.
53 Ibid.
54 Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1996), p.218.
55 Stephen P. Cohen, p.58.
90 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
of Necessity “to justify coups against civilian governments by generals
Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf”.56
The bureaucrat-military alliance with the support of their strategic
partners was successful in eroding the democratic institutions and
establishing a “constitutional dictatorship” in Pakistan. This
constitutional dictatorship was the vehicle to be used for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO. “The interplay of domestic, regional
and international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the
institutional balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed
over politicians”.57
56 Ibid.
57 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political
Economy of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.193.
Dr. Lubna Saif*
This paper seeks to investigate why Pakistan became a member of
South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it was not part of
South East Asia. By joining SEATO, Pakistan became an ally of the
American Power System in Cold War against Communism. This
strategic partnership strengthened non-democratic forces in Pakistan
eroding the fragile democratic institutions and established a
“constitutional dictatorship” which was used as a vehicle for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO.
Cold War and American Power System
The year 1946 is marked with the Cold War demonstrations when
Harry Truman declared that “no more recognition of communist
governments” and “I am sick of babying the Soviets”.1 Under the
influence of his advisors, especially George Marshall, Truman supported
their hard-line advice and policies against the Soviet Union. By 1947
these policies came to be known as “containment”. George Kennan
became the “father of containment” with his “long telegram” of February
22.2 Kennan’s depiction of communism as a “malignant parasite” that
had to be contained by all possible measures, became the ideological
foundation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and National Security
Act of 1947. In his inaugural address of 20 January 1949, Truman
declared four points about his “program for peace and freedom”: to
support the UN, the European Recovery Program, the collective defence
of the North Atlantic region, and a “bold new program” for technical aid
* Chairperson, Department of Pakistan Studies, Allama Iqbal Open University,
Islamabad.
1 Harry Truman to James Byrnes, 5 June 1946. Cold War Policies, Retrieved, 21
December 02. http://history.sandiego.edu. /truman46.html.
2 See, Thomas Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (New York, 1988).
78 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
to the poor nations.3 It was believed that because of his programs, “the
future of mankind would be assured in a world of justice, harmony and
peace”.4 Thus the containment was not only a policy, rather it was a way
of life. The probable fission bomb capacity of the Soviet Union greatly
intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States, which
culminated in NSC 68.5 Fearing the threat of Soviet atomic capabilities,
it was felt that the US programs and plans were dangerously inadequate
in terms of timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress towards
the attainment of the United States’ political, economic, and military
objectives. It was argued that the “continuation of …[present] trends
would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative
to the Soviet Union and its satellites…These trends lead in the direction
of isolation not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis
for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.”6 The
Europe was defeated and US became the “centre of power in the free
world”. This was reflected in the conclusion, which stated, “we must
organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a
positive program for peace which [would] frustrate the Kremlin design
for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which
the Kremlin… [would] be compelled to adjust”.7 It was believed that
without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, the free world
would have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until they
discover one day that they had sacrificed positions of vital interest.8 To
secure these “positions of vital interest”, a much more “rapid and
concerted build-up of the actual strength” of both the United States and
the other nations of the free world was suggested in the analysis. The
program envisaged “the political and economic measure with which and
the military shield behind which the free world [could] work to frustrate
the Kremlin design by the strategy of the Cold War”.9 Avoiding the
direct war with the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conceived with the
aim to frustrate “the Kremlin’s design by the steady development of the
moral and material strength by the free world and its projection into the
3 Cold War Policies. Retrieved, 21 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/20th /truman46.html.
4 Ibid.
5 Cold War Policies. Retrieved 19 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/1950s/nsc68.html.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 79
Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the
Soviet system.”10 The conclusion summarized that “by means of a rapid
and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of
the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest
the initiative from the Soviet Union”, the USA would be in a position to
“confront with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of
the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its
will”.11 It was thought that ‘such evidence [was] the only means short of
war, which eventually [might] force the Kremlin to abandon its [existing]
course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of
major importance”.12
The election of 1952 in the U.S. brought former Allied Commander
Dwight Eisenhower to the White House, who chose John Foster Dulles
as his Secretary of State. Together, Eisenhower and Dulles further
modified the Containment Doctrine as articulated in NSC-68. With
Eisenhower in office, the U.S. Defence Policy took a more offensive
“New Look”. His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “a patrician,
visceral anticommunist closely tied to the nation’s financial
establishment, was obsessed with communism’s challenge to the U.S.
corporate power in the Third World.”13 Dulles criticized the foreign
policy of Truman and argued that the policy of “containment” should be
replaced by a policy of “liberation”. Dulles considered neutrality as an
obsolete and an immoral and shortsighted conception. Alliances such as
NATO were the part of his “liberation strategy”.
Cold War, Defence Pacts and Pakistan
For American policy makers, the Cold War was in fact a real war in
which the survival of the free world was at stake and Pakistan before its
birth was destined to enter into this war. Pakistan’s proximity to the
Soviet Union and China, the emerging Communist Block and the Middle
East and Iran the centre of oil resources or “wells of power” placed it in a
very critical position on the “security map of the free world”. The key
event in the South Asian arena of Cold War competition was the signing
of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the
United States on 19 May 1954 with the major objective to build defence
establishment in Pakistan to be used to block any Soviet thrust into the
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 ‘Cold War (1953-1962)’ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 26 June
2004. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cold_war.
80 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
crucial Middle East and provide United States with valuable military
bases against Soviet Union. The Mutual Defence Agreement resulted in
Pakistan’s signing the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact also referred to as
the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO). The SEATO was
established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila
Pact), which was signed at Manila in September 1954. The SEATO
became effective on 19 February 1955 and was signed by Pakistan,
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand
and the United States. Pakistan was included in the alliance though it was
not a part of South East Asia.
By signing these Defence pacts, Pakistan became one of the first
few allies of the American Power System in its war against Communism
in an environment when most of the Third World countries were
campaigning for nationalism, social reformism and anti-imperialism and
refused to be part of the American Power System in the Cold War era.
Dulles is known in history for his efforts to “integrate the entire
noncommunist Third World into a system of mutual defence pacts,
travelling almost 500,000 miles in order to cement new alliances that
were modelled after (NATO)”.14 The emphasis on pacts was a logical
culmination of Truman-Acheson containment, which called for strong
alliance systems directed by the U.S. and collective security pacts.
Dulles, along-with most U.S. foreign policy-makers of the era, failed to
distinguish indigenous Third World social revolutionaries and
nationalists from the Soviet influence. Neutrality for Dulles was “an
obsolete, immoral and short-sighted conception”.15
In its war against Communism, Dulles found cooperative partnersgenerals
and bureaucrats who were trained by the British colonial
strategist minds believing in a concept of a security state and groomed in
a colonial tradition of “controlled democracy”. They were put in control
of affairs at the expense of the democratic institutions to steer Pakistan
towards Dulles’s collective security pacts. In April 1953 the Governor-
General destroying the notion of the cabinet government dismissed the
Prime Minister Nazimuddin to pave the way for negotiating the Mutual
Defence Agreement under an “authoritarian regime” which was
unaccountable to the people of Pakistan and backed by the army. This
authoritarian regime led by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad was
again successful in dismissing the provincial government of East
Pakistan in May 1954 when it voiced against the signing of the Mutual
14 ‘Dulles’, Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 81
Defence Agreement. An authoritarian regime under the disguise of a
democratic set up was felt necessary to influence Pakistan to join the
Defence Pacts, SEATO and Baghdad Pact, since the majority of the
parliamentarians and the people of Pakistan were not in favour of joining
these defence pacts. The fear of widespread public protest over the
question of Pakistan’s joining these defence pacts and support of Soviet
Union for any such popular movement was keeping Pakistan’s
authoritarian regime in a dilemma to publicly announce its intentions to
join any defence pact against Communism.
Pakistan’s Forced Entry into the SEATO
In the following discussion, we will examine how Pakistan was
persuaded to join SEATO. Dulles initiated the SEATO as a security
arrangement for the region of Southeast Asia. The idea was publicly
discussed in Geneva Peace Conference in May 1954 in the aftermath of
Indo-China conflict. On July 24, 1954, presenting his “Five Point
Program on South-East Asia and Europe”, Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of
State highlighted following points:
First. As an interim protection, to fill what is clearly a dangerous vacuum
in South-East Asia, there should be a prompt declaration of intention on
the part of all the free nations, including the so-called neutralist block,
against further aggression by means of external invasion or internal
penetration. Second. Simultaneously, every effort should be made to move
ahead on the longer range of hard and fast military commitments under a
South-East Asia defence pact. With all the many Asiatic powers we would
like to see join such a pact may not be willing to enter it that should not
serve as a veto on all the others.16
During the Geneva Peace Conference, the Foreign Office, London
was informed that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to
join in a pact for the defence of South-East Asia and that Burma had
refused.17 Following the Geneva Conference, the joint United Kingdom-
United States Study Group on South-East Asia agreed upon “collective
security pact and declaration of intention.”18 It was recorded that the
United States had agreed that “invitations should be issued by 7 August
for a meeting at the beginning of September to draw up a treaty”. It was
further recorded that “an approach should now be made to the Colombo
16 Extract from Pages 11288-9 of Congressional Record, 24 July 1954, Foreign Office
[henceforth FO] 371/111875, The National Archives: Public Record Office
[henceforth TNA: PRO].
17 Geneva to FO, 17 May 1954, D 1074/10, FO 371/111862, TNA: PRO.
18 FO Minute, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
82 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Powers to urge their participation in talks on the treaty”. Earlier, the State
Department informed all the U.S. embassies in Asia on 24 July 1954 that
an agreement had been reached between America and Britain to hold a
conference on Southeast Asian defence as the first step. The diplomatic
missions were also told that the British Government was assigned the
responsibility to invite the governments of Australia, New Zealand,
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of participating
in establishing a collective security agreement in South-East Asia.19 On
30 July 1954, Commonwealth Relations Office, London sent a telegram
to its high commissioners in India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa which stated that “the
Foreign Secretary [had] undertaken that invitation should be issued not
later than 7 August to the Conference to be held not later than 1st
September to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a Collective
Defence Agreement”.20 To make an immediate approach to Colombo
Powers, a telegram containing the text of a message from the Foreign
Secretary to the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon was sent
by the Commonwealth Relations Office, London on the same day. A
similar message was sent to the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia.
In the telegram the fears were expressed that the Indian reaction to the
approach was bound to be negative, therefore, it was considered
important “to ensure that Nehru’s reaction should be as favourable as
possible”. It was hoped that positive reaction from Pakistan, Ceylon and
Burma would “exercise a moderating influence on Nehru”. The
Commonwealth Relations Office was “cognizant of the difficulties vis-àvis
India, if Pakistan were to go it alone without the support of any other
Colombo Power, but there [could] be no question of our dissuading
either Pakistan or Ceylon from joining”. The Commonwealth Relations
Office conveyed to high commissioners that they were “indeed most
anxious to have the support of any Asian country or countries, other than
Siam and the Philippines that [could] be persuaded to join or to be
associated with the organization”. In his message the British Foreign
Secretary, invited the Prime Ministers of Colombo Power by informing
that:
We have long been in favour of creating a broadly based defensive
organization in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. After careful
study of this problem, our ideas have now crystallized sufficiently for me
19 Laithwaite to CRO, 23 July 1954, D 1074/271, FO 371/111873, TNA: PRO.
20 Telegram no. 334, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
Pakistan and SEATO 83
to seek your views on them, and I hope you will give them very serious
consideration.21
The Foreign Secretary in his message expressed the hope “to see the
Asian powers play a leading role in the defence of South-East Asia”.
Emphasizing the importance of the area, he was of the view that “its
peace [was] as yet so insecure, that [they felt it] vital to safeguard its
peaceful development and ensure its stability”. The purpose of the
meeting was “to consider possible measures of collective defence for
South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific in the hope of producing
agreed recommendations for consideration by the participating
governments and a draft collective defence agreement”. Three specific
subjects to be considered at the meeting were: “a) measure of military,
economic or technical assistance to countries wishing to strengthen their
resistance to external interference of any kind; b) consultation with a
view to common action, should the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area,
be endangered; c) action in the event of overt aggression”.22 The treaty
was said to be discussed with Chou En-lai in Geneva and the Chinese
were reported to be “well aware that [Anglo-American block] intende[d]
to press forward on these lines”. It was informed that “during these
discussions Chou En-lai was mainly concerned to obtain assurances
about the neutrality of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam”. It was made clear
that these countries were not going to “be the members of the proposed
organization”.23
The news that Pakistan had decided to participate in the conference
on South-East Asia defence was received with great pleasure and
considered “an excellent development”.24 Although, Pakistan had
decided to participate in the Manila Treaty Conference, she was not yet
ready to become a member of the South-East Asia Organization. The
message of Mohammad Ali Bogra stated:
My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret personal
message of 30 July. I am glad to be able to inform you that Pakistan will be
represented at the proposed meeting, which is planned for the beginning of
September to consider possible measures of collective defence for South-
East Asia and South West Asia. Our participation in the meeting does not
imply prior acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the
21 Telegram no. 335, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 FO Minute, 5 August 1954, D 1074/300, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
84 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
discussions in the meeting. Any recommendations made by the meeting
will be considered on their merits.25
On the other hand, Nehru’s reaction to the Manila Treaty
Conference as expected was very critical. Refusing to be associated with
any such proposed organization, Nehru argued that “an organization of
the kind proposed was more likely to promote mistrust and suspicion
than security”.26 He observed that “though it was called a defensive
arrangement it was by inference directed against China and was
motivated by fear about Chinese intentions”. He opined that any such
organization “would only serve to divide South and South-East Asia into
rival groups and would therefore, in his opinion largely undo much of the
great achievement of Geneva”. Nehru was seen convinced that “China
harboured no aggressive intentions” and there was no need for its
neighbours to feel threatened. This was not the view upheld by the
Anglo-American block, that professed that “China was the exponent of a
militant political philosophy to which [they] were unalterably opposed
and which by its very nature could scarcely allow weak neighbours to
develop freely along lines of their own choosing”.27 Criticizing the South
East Asian and South West Pacific Organization, Nehru asserted that “it
was far from being a collective peace system rather a military alliance”.28
Nehru warned that it would “possibly result in the formation of a
counter-military alliance”. He further argued that “the majority of Asian
countries [would] not be participating in the organization. Some would
even be strongly opposed to it, thus rendering South-East Asia a
potentially explosive theatre of the Cold War”.29
Nehru’s stand made it more essential that either Ceylon or Pakistan
should be persuaded to participate in the organization. It was more
convenient to press the authoritarian regime in Pakistan to bow before
the wishes of Dulles and his partners. In view of India’s criticism and
anticipated strong reactions from Moscow and Peking (Beijing), it was
easy for Pakistan’s pro-West leadership to offer unconditional support to
the proposed organization, a fact reflected in Mohammad Ali Bogra’s
message accepting the invitation to participate in the Manila Conference.
However, the governments of U.K. and U.S. were “anxious to secure
Pakistan’s participation or association with a South-East Asian
25 Laithwaite to CRO, 4 August 1954, D 1074/323, FO 371/ 111876, TNA: PRO.
26 Telegram No. 734, D 1074/303, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
27 Ibid.
28 Telegram No. 739, D 1074/303 (A), FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
29 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 85
Organization even if she were the only Colombo Power”.30 It appeared
that there were some serious Anglo-American differences over the
strategy and control of a South East Asia Organization. It is interesting to
note that, how both the parties were exploiting Pakistan’s association for
gaining their specific interests. After knowing that Dulles had already
invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South-
East Asia, the Foreign Office, London and the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations were keen to show that they were more
“anxious” than the U.S. for Pakistan’s association hoping that “there
would be at least one Asian country to act as a counter-weight to the
American protégées-Siam and the Philippines”.31 It was argued that
“Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either
Siam [Thailand] or the Philippines”. The Foreign Office felt “if Pakistan
were excluded, it would be widely believed that [the British], rather than
the Americans, were responsible, and there would be a repetition of the
resentment towards the United Kingdom felt at the time of the
conclusion of the agreement with Turkey”. The fear was expressed that
the United States might prefer to dominate SEATO by excluding
Colombo Powers. Therefore, Pakistan’s association was considered
essential. To make their case more convincing, the Foreign Office,
London argued “if Pakistan were to come in now it would make it easier
for other Colombo Powers to come in later, e.g., Ceylon, Burma, and if
there [was] a victory of the Masjumi (Moslem Party) in the elections next
February [in] Indonesia.”32 To convince Pakistan to participate, it was
argued that “Pakistan’s interests in East Bengal give her a direct interest
in South-East Asian security”.33 According to American analysis, the
closeness of former East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South East
Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. It was
emphasized that it would be more difficult to justify the introduction of
American military equipment into East Pakistan, if Pakistan’s security
interests were primarily directed towards the Middle East.34
It was widely believed that “Foreign Minister [of Pakistan] by
signing the instrument in Manila had gone rather further than his
30 Pakistan and S.E.A.T.O. D 1074/300 (A), 29 July 1954, FO 371/111875, TNA:
PRO.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Allen to State Department, 28 July 1954, Telegram No. 118, 310 SEATO,
NDD.842430, RG 84, Box 42, File 350-Pak.Pol., National Archives USA,
Washington D.C.
86 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Government had intended, and that there had been genuine
embarrassment between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
about something which the latter had done in order to be as cooperative
as possible with Mr. Dulles”.35 The Pakistan Ambassador was concerned
to maintain the “balance between tacit approval of South-East Asia
Treaty Organization and strict neutrality supported by fear of possible
Chinese reaction”.36 As expected, the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty provoked great criticism in Moscow and Peking.
Defending the Manila Treaty, the British Ambassador in Bangkok
observed in a press conference on 24 September 1954, that:
The propaganda attack against the treaty made by Moscow and Peking and
echoed by other communist agencies have been very violent. All have
denounced the Manila Treaty as “aggressive”. The falseness of this charge
and the fury with which it had been levelled show how effective it must
appear in communist eyes for the purpose for which it was designed,
namely the defence of South-East Asia against aggression. It should not be
forgotten that Chinese have their own treaty with the Soviet Union and
hence have no right to question whatever arrangement we may make with
our friends for our mutual defence.37
Despite the difficulties Pakistan could face over ratification of
SEATO, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was not given a sympathetic
hearing whenever he tried to explain Pakistan’s difficult position. The
minutes of such a meeting with the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence held in the Foreign Office London, reveal how the Prime
Minister’s position was humiliated rather showing an understanding
attitude for the difficult position in which Pakistan was being placed by
signing SEATO.38 It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra “haggled a
lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on the lines of
what “do we get out of it if we did become members, what about India
etc? The minutes recorded that “the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence pressed Mohammad Ali Bogra strongly on loss of prestige and
other good reasons why it would be very short sighted of Pakistan to
back down now”.39 The record further reveals that “later the Foreign
Secretary and Lord Alexander had a further discussion with Mohammad
35 The Pakistan Ambassador told the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, A
letter by the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka to (Peterson) South-East Asia
Department Foreign Office, D 1074/693, FO 371/116933, TNA: PRO.
36 Ibid.
37 Bangkok to CRO, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
38 FO Minute, 30 September 1954, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
39 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 87
Ali Bogra when the latter said that he would like to think more about this
and have another meeting after he returned from Washington”.40
Bogra’s reluctance was due to the increasing pressure from the
Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly. These members opposed
to any Defence pact, were also in the process of finalizing the future
constitution of Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly was reconvened on
14 March 1954 after a long break of four months and had resumed the
work on the finalization of the remaining clauses of the Basic Principles
Committee Report. The Governor-General, who was in control of the
central executive but was unable to extend its authority over the
Constituent Assembly, was not pleased with these developments. Once
the constitution was framed, the Governor-General’s position was about
to change and the focus of the power had to shift to the representative
forces. In July, Sir Ivor Jennings arrived in Pakistan to assist in the
drafting of the constitution on the invitation of the Assembly’s
Constitutional Drafting Committee. On 15 September, Bogra announced
in the Assembly that, “he [was] grateful to God that at long last [they
had]… crossed the last hurdle in Pakistan”.41 On 20 September, the
Assembly abolished the Public and Representative Offices
Disqualification Act (PRODA), the most powerful executive weapon,
since it was passed during Liaquat’s ministry. The next day, the
Constituent Assembly amended the Government of India Act 1935,
which prevented the Governor-General from dismissing the cabinet,
which was made responsible to the National Assembly through this
amendment. “This was the move to make the government completely
dependent upon the Assembly and to prevent the repetition of the
exercise of the Governor-General’s power of intervention”.42 According
to the fifth Amendment only members of the Assembly were to be
selected as cabinet ministers and could continue to hold only as long as
they retained the confidence of the legislature and similarly the Prime
Minister was required to be a member of the Assembly at the time of his
appointment.43 Furthermore, the cabinet was decided to be collectively
responsible to the Assembly, and would be required to resign if any one
of its members lost the confidence of the Assembly. By making these
40 Ibid.
41 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.353-65.
42 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1957), p.105.
43 XVI CAD (Con.), p.251 Government of India (5th Amendment) Act, 1954,
amending Sections 9, 10, 10A, 10 B, and 17. Pakistan Times, 22 September 1954;
Dawn, 21 September 1954.
88 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
amendments, the Assembly declared its supremacy and its objective to
ensure that “formation and working of government” should be in
accordance with the “accepted principles and conventions” of a
parliamentary system of government”.44 With the caption, “Parliament
Made Supreme Body”, Dawn stated that “the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan yesterday laid down in clear and unambiguous terms that from
that day the supreme authority in the country shall be the Parliament”.45
On 21 September, the Assembly voted its approval of the
constitution in the form of the Basic Principles Committee Report as
amended.46 Out of 40 votes polled, 27 were in favour, 11 Hindu members
voted against and none of the members from the Punjab voted on the
constitution. The Assembly then was adjourned until 27 October,
concluding what was called a “historical session”.47 In contrast, this was
seen as “veritable coup” carried out by Bengali members of the assembly
backed by ‘some have-nots” of the Muslim League.48 The British High
Commissioner observed that “one result [of the constitutional changes
was] to bring a step nearer the possibility that the Army and the higher
Civil Services…[might] one day come to the conclusion that the
politicians have made such a mess that it is necessary for non-political
forces to take over”.49 This observation was the mirror image of the
thinking of the “neo-colonial powers”, who claimed to be the champions
of democracy and protectors of the “free world” but to secure their
strategic interests found justification in promoting the non-political and
non-democratic forces at the expense of derailing the democratic process
in Pakistan. “Pakistan’s international supporters were ambivalent about
democracy too. The American Agenda was clear: a pro-Western
Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic
Pakistan were all desirable, but in that order. When democracy
threatened to remove a leadership that was less than pro-America, the
U.S. Embassy conveyed this priority to Pakistanis”.50 Supported by these
protectors of the “free world”, the Governor General ordered the police
to bar the members of the Constituent Assembly from attending the
session of the Assembly on 27 October 1954 which was called
44 Keith Callard, p.107.
45 Dawn, Karachi, 22 September 1954.
46 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.499-510, 570-72.
47 Dawn, 22 September 1954.
48 Karachi to CRO, 30 September 1954, DO35/5135, TNA: PRO.
49 Ibid.
50 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.56.
Pakistan and SEATO 89
specifically to vote on the draft constitution approved in the Assembly’s
previous session.51 The next day, the Governor General dissolved the
Constituent Assembly, and appointed a ‘semi dictatorial executive”
praised as a “cabinet of talents”, in which the Army Chief, General
Muhammad Ayub was included as the Defence Minister. “From all
accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Muhammad’s plan to
dismiss the Constituent Assembly once for all and to start again was
worked out with General Ayub’s prior knowledge. It is, moreover,
probable that without the assurance of the Army’s support, Ghulam
Muhammad might have hesitated”.52 General Ayub’s inclusion in the
cabinet was the indication to suggest that “this was no time for nonesense”
53 and that there should be no doubt left that the Army was the
negotiating power in the state construction and the real partner in
Dulles’s defence strategic plans.
“On 28 October 1954, the Assembly, which until then had been an
operating political body and had produced a new constitution, became a
‘failure’. But it was the success not the failure, which brought about its
demise.”54 The termination of parliamentary democracy was not the
result of “failure” within the Assembly or defects in the new
constitutional changes as suggested by the British High Commissioner
and campaigned by the Governor General and his associates, rather the
strategic partnership with the American Power System that promoted
authoritarianism was the real culprit. It was declared that the electorate
was bound to act foolish, as they had done in the East Pakistan election
clearly. This was so because masses were illiterate and needed further
training in democratic institutions. The assertion was until that was
accomplished there would be a need of “controlled democracy”.
Governor General’s action of dissolving the Constituent Assembly got
the judicial legitimacy by the Federal Court’s theory of “Law of
Necessity” declaring “that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity
makes lawful”.55 The effect of this theory was that those in command of
coercive powers of the state had the right to suspend constitutional
government when and for however long they thought necessary. The
subsequent courts in Pakistan have retroactively cited the theory of Law
51 Ibid, p.60.
52 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p.41.
53 Ibid.
54 Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1996), p.218.
55 Stephen P. Cohen, p.58.
90 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
of Necessity “to justify coups against civilian governments by generals
Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf”.56
The bureaucrat-military alliance with the support of their strategic
partners was successful in eroding the democratic institutions and
establishing a “constitutional dictatorship” in Pakistan. This
constitutional dictatorship was the vehicle to be used for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO. “The interplay of domestic, regional
and international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the
institutional balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed
over politicians”.57
56 Ibid.
57 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political
Economy of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.193.
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