I visited Indonesia’s Komodo Island,
home to the largest living species of
lizard, by ship during a cruise from
Sydney to Singapore. The huge Komodo
dragon, weighing up to 70 kg (150
pounds) and two to three metres (7 to 10
feet) in length, is probably the remnant
of a population of large lizards, which
once existed in Australia and Indonesia.
Now native to four Indonesian islands
including Komodo, the animals became
isolated there after sea levels rose some
900,000 years ago.
One of the Republic of Indonesia’s
17,500 islands, Komodo, with an area
of 390 square km (150 square miles),
has more than 4,000 human inhabitants,
many of whom are descended from
convicts exiled to the island who
intermingled with tribes from Sulawesi
and elsewhere. Situated between the
larger islands of Flores and Sumbawa,
Komodo is visited not only by those
wishing to view the largest living lizard
but also by scuba divers.
As our ship approached to Komodo,
anticipation ran high among the
passengers. The scenery in the bay
where we anchored was dramatic as
the island had a green forest cover,
which contrasted with the deep blue
surrounding waters. During my shore
excursion I visited Komodo National
Park, established in 1980. Designated
in 1986 as both a World Heritage Site
and a Man and Biosphere Reserve by
UNESCO, the park harbours not only
the iconic Komodo dragon but also
such mammals as the Timor deer and an
endemic rat. The marine environment,
hosting, among other creatures, over
1,000 fish species, constitutes two-thirds
of the national park.
After proceeding ashore by tender,
I walked with a group accompanied
by a ranger along a well-marked milelong
forest trail. During that walk, we
encountered dragons in four locations.
I observed that the tail of the Komodo
dragon is nearly a long as its body and
that the animal has a long, yellow-forked
tongue. I had read that the animal has
about 60 serrated teeth up to 2.5 cm
(one inch) long. The lizard is capable of
running up to 20 km/hour (12.4 miles/
hour) for brief periods. When young it
can even use its claws to climb trees.
The dragon has also been known to stand
on its hind legs, using its tail for support
in order to reach its prey.
First recorded by Western scientists in
1910, the Komodo dragon, classified as
a vulnerable species, eats mostly carrion.
However, the dragon will also attempt

POST-LADAKH EXTENSION
By Train to Agra
The Taj Mahal, Fort Rouge and Fatehpur Sikri
Taj Mahal

HIMALAYAN ODYSSEY TOURS
By Train to Agra:
The Taj Mahal, Fort Rouge and Fatehpur Sikri
Overnight excursion from Delhi to Agra, with visits to three UNESCO world heritage sites: the incomparable
Taj Mahal, the Agra Fort and Fatehpur Sikri.
This optional post-trip extension begins from the same 5-star boutique hotel in Delhi (Hotel Siddarth) that is our home for the first and last nights of the main tour. The standard itinerary calls for a departure from Delhi back to
the U.S. on July 26. Participants in this extension will depart India July 28.
We leave our very comfortable accommodations at Hotel Siddarth early morning for a 6:00 A.M. departure by deluxe, air conditioned express train to Agra – about a three hour ride. The views from the train will offer a fascinating perspective into a very different dimension of India than we’ve just experienced in the far north.
The landscape, ethnicity and culture here is far more classically “Indian” than the arid, high altitude Himalayan
world of Ladakh.
We will be met at the Agra train station by our driver and guide, and spend the day exploring the sights of Agra by air conditioned SUV or mini-van. We overnight in Agra at the 5-star Jaypees Palace hotel, with dinner at the hotel
or a local restaurant. The following morning we continue our exploration of the Agra area, departing mid-afternoon by private car for the return trip to Delhi. We should arrive back in Delhi with time for relaxing at the hotel or
last-minute shopping and packing for our departure back to the U.S. the following day.
•
The Taj Mahal
Perhaps no other single man-made structure in the world is so universally admired and so iconic a travel destination. Often cited as one of the “Seven Wonders of the World”, the Taj Mahal is a masterwork of Mughal architecture and an emblematic symbol of love and devotion.
The Taj was commissioned in 1632 by the Emperor Shah Jahan as a tribute to his favored wife, Mumtaz Mahal,
who had died giving birth to their fourteenth child. No expense or effort was spared in creating the most magnificent structure possible. Over twenty years in the making, a work force of 20,000 laborers and 1,000 elephants transported the finest materials from across the subcontinent and central Asia to Agra, where the most accomplished master craftsmen and artisans from many countries labored together in common purpose.
Although the white domed marble mausoleum is the most recognizable element of the Taj, it is actually just one component in an integrated complex of structures that includes several outlying buildings, gardens and reflecting pools.
•

•
The Red Fort of Agra
The Red Fort (Fort Rouge, Lal Qila) takes its name from the massive red sandstone walls that encircle it. Once the imperial city of successive Mughal dynasties, it served as the center of government, the state treasury and the state mint. Within this sprawling complex are numerous palaces and beautiful mosques and pavilions, dating from the 1600s. The Red Fort combines elements of both Hindu and Islamic architecture, and incorporates decorative imagery of living beings, such as elephants and birds – which is forbidden in purely Islamic structures.
Fatehpur Sikri
Located 26 miles from Agra, this city was the political capital of the Mughal Empire in the latter 1500s. In the Arabic, Persian and Urdu languages, Fateh means victory, and the city was built to commemorate Emperor Babur’s defeat of Rana Sanga in the battle of Khanwa. An especially eclectic display of cultural influences and motifs, Fatehpur Sikri employed Bengali and Gujarati craftsmen, creating a synthesis of Hindu, Jain and Islamic styles. Fatehpur Sikri is regarded as the apex of Akbar’s architectural legacy.
•
EXCURSION COSTS:
$875*
Per person, all inclusive of one additional night’s stay at the Hotel Siddarth in Delhi, one night’s stay at the
Jaypee Palace hotel in Agra, all meals in Agra, transportation (one-way by train, one-way by private vehicle), drivers, guide, and monument entrance fees. Not inclusive are alcoholic drinks, tips to drivers and guides, or
dinner on the evening of the 27th.
*Based on double occupancy hotel rooms. For solo hotel accommodations, please add $220.

By the mid 9th century the Abbasids were losing control over their vast Muslim empire. Distance
hampered efforts to move armies and control local administrators. Most subjects retained local loyalties.
Shi'i dissenters were particularly troublesome, while slave and peasant risings sapped empire strength.
Mongol invasions in the 13th century ended the very weakened state. Despite the political decline, Islamic
civilization reached new cultural heights, and Islam expanded widely in the Afro-Asian world through
conquest and peaceful conversion.
The Islamic Heartlands in the Middle and Late Abbasid Era. The Abbasid Empire disintegrated
between the 9th and 13th centuries. Peasant revolts and slavery increased. Despite the artistic and
intellectual creativity of the age, the position of women eroded. Signs of decline were present during the
reign of Caliph al-Mahdi (775-785). He failed to reconcile moderate Shi'i to Abbasid rule. Al-Mahdi
abandoned the frugal ways of his predecessor and surrounded his court with luxury. He failed to establish a
succession system resolving disputes among his many sons, leaving a lasting problem to future rulers.
Imperial Extravagance and Succession Disputes. One son, Harun al-Rashid, became one of the most
famous Abbasid caliphs. The luxury and intrigues of his court were immortalized in The Thousand and
One Nights. The young ruler became dependent on Persian advisors, a trend followed during later reigns
as rulers became pawns in factional court struggles. Al-Rashid's death led to the first of many civil wars
over the succession. The sons of the winner, al-Ma'mun, built personal retainer armies, some including
Turkic nomads, to safeguard their futures. The armies became power centers, removing and selecting
caliphs; their uncontrolled excesses developed into a general focus for societal unrest.
Imperial Breakdown and Agrarian Disorder. The continual civil violence drained the imperial
treasury. Caliphs increased the strain by constructing costly new imperial centers. Peasants had imposing
tax burdens, often collected by oppressive tax farmers, forced upon them. Agricultural villages were
abandoned and irrigation works fell into disrepair. Bandits and vagabonds were everywhere; they
participated in peasant rebellions often instigated by dissident religious groups.
The Declining Position of Women in the Family and Society. The freedom and influence possessed
during the 1st centuries of Islam severely declined. Male-dominated Abbasid society imagined that
women possessed incurable lust, and therefore men needed to be segregated from all but the women of
their family. The harem and the veil symbolized subjugation to males. The seclusion of elite women,
wives and concubines, continued, and the practice of veiling spread to all. Abbasid wealth generated large
demand for concubines and male slaves. Most came from non-Muslim neighboring lands. Poor women
remained economically active, but the rich were kept at home. They married at puberty and spent their
lives in domestic management and childbearing. At higher political levels women intrigued for
advancement of their sons' careers.
Nomadic Incursions and the Eclipse of Caliphal Power. By the mid-10th century breakaway former
provinces began to challenge Abbasid rule. The Buyids of Persia captured Baghdad in 945. The caliphs
henceforth became powerless puppets controlled by sultans, the actual rulers. The Seljuk Turks defeated
the Buyids in 1055 and ruled the remnants of the Abbasid empire for two centuries. The Seljuks were
staunch Sunnis who purged the Shi’i. For a time Seljuk military power restored the diminished caliphate.
Egyptians and Byzantines were defeated, the latter success opening Anatolia, the nucleus of the later
Ottoman Empire, to settlement by Turkic nomads.
The Impact of the Christian Crusades. West European Christian knights in 1096 invaded Muslim
territory to capture the biblical Holy Land. They established small, rival kingdoms that were not a threat
to the more powerful surrounding Muslim leaders. Most were recaptured near the close of the 12th
century by Muslims reunited under Saladin. The last fell in 1291. The Crusades had an important impact
upon the Christian world through intensifying the existing European borrowing from the more
sophisticated technology, architecture, medicine, mathematics, science, and general culture of Muslim
civilization. Europeans recovered much Greek learning lost after the fall of Rome. Italian merchants
remained in Islamic centers after the Crusader defeat and were far more important carriers of Islamic
advanced knowledge than the Christian warriors. Muslim peoples were little interested in aspects of
European civilization.
AN AGE OF LEARNING AND ARTISTIC REFINEMENT. The political and social turmoil of late
Abbasid times did not prevent Muslim thinkers and craftsmen, in states from Spain to Persia, from
producing one of the great ages of human creativity. Rapid urban growth and its associated prosperity
persisted until late in the Abbasid era. Employment opportunities for skilled individuals remained
abundant. Merchants amassed large fortunes through supplying urban needs and from long-distance trade
to India, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, and Europe. Artists and artisans created mosques, palaces,
tapestries, rugs, bronzes, and ceramics.
The Full Flowering of Persian Literature. Persian replaced Arabic as the primary written language of
the Abbasid court. Arabic was the language of religion, law, and the natural sciences; Persian became the
language of "high culture," used for literary expression, administration, and scholarship. The
development of a beautiful calligraphy made literature a visual art form. Perhaps the greatest work was
Firdawsi's epic poem, Shah-Nama, a history of Persia from creation to Islamic conquest. Other writers, as
the great poet Sa’di and Omar Khayyam in the Rubiyat, blended mystical and commonplace themes in
their work.
Achievements in the Sciences. Muslim society for several centuries surpassed all others in scientific and
technological discoveries. In mathematics thinkers made major corrections in the theories learned from
the ancient Greeks. In chemistry they created the objective experiment. Al-Razi classified all material
substances into three categories: animal, vegetable, mineral. Al-Biruni calculated the exact specific
weight of 18 major minerals. Sophisticated, improved, astronomical instruments, like the astrolabe, were
used for mapping the heavens. Much of the Muslim achievement had practical application. In medicine
improved hospitals and formal courses of studies accompanied important experimental work. Traders and
craftsmen introduced machines and techniques originating in China for paper making, silk weaving, and
ceramic firing. Scholars made some of the world's best maps.
Religious Trends and the New Impetus for Expansion. The conflicting social and political trends
showed in divergent patterns of religious development. Sufis developed vibrant mysticism, but ulama
(religious scholars) became more conservative and suspicious of non-Muslim influences and scientific
thought. They were suspicious of Greek rationalism and insisted that the Quran was the all-embracing
source of knowledge. The great theologian al-Ghazali struggled to fuse Greek and Quranic traditions, but
often was opposed by orthodox scholars. The Sufis created the most innovative religious movement.
They reacted against the arid teachings of the ulama and sought personal union with Allah through
asceticism, meditation, songs, dancing, or drugs. Many Sufis gained reputations as healers and miracle
workers; others made the movement a central factor in the continuing expansion of Islam.
New Waves of Nomadic Invasions and the End of the Caliphate. In the early 13th century central
Asian nomadic invaders, the Mongols, threatened Islamic lands. Chinggis Khan destroyed the Turkic-
Persian kingdoms east of Baghdad. His grandson, Hulegu, continued the assault. The last Abbasid ruler
was killed when Baghdad fell in 1258. The once great Abbasid capital became an unimportant backwater
in the Muslim world.
The Coming of Islam to South Asia. Muslim invasions from the 7th century added to the complexity of
Indian civilization. Previous nomadic invaders usually had blended over time into India’s sophisticated
civilization. Muslims, possessors of an equally sophisticated, but very different, culture, were a new
factor. The open, tolerant, and inclusive Hindu religion, based in a social system dominated by castes,
Islam was doctrinaire, monotheistic, evangelical, and egalitarian. In the earlier period of contact, conflict
predominated, but as time passed, although tensions persisted, peaceful commercial and religious
exchange occurred in a society where Muslim rulers governed Hindu subjects.
North India on the Eve of the Muslim Invasions. North India remained politically divided between
rival dynasties after the 5th century fall of the Gupta until Harsha in the 7th century created a stable
successor empire in the central and eastern Ganges plain. Although he ruled an area larger than any
contemporary European realm, Harsha failed to unite India’s subcontinent. Harsha's reign was a time of
peace and prosperity. He built roads, rest houses, and hospitals; he endowed temples and Buddhist
monasteries. Urban areas, as the capital at Kanuji, flourished and artistic creativity revived. Harsha, a
Hindu, was tolerant of all faiths and strongly attracted to Buddhism.
Political Divisions and the First Muslim Invasions. Harsha's empire collapsed with his death in 646.
Hindu culture continued to flourish, but political divisions left north India open to Muslim invasions
beginning in 711. The Umayyad general Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered and annexed Sind, and ,
despite quarrels among succeeding Muslim dynasties, the occupation endured. Many Indians, treated as
"people of the book," welcomed the new rulers because offered religious tolerance and lighter taxes. Most
indigenous officials retained their positions, while brahmin castes were respected. Few Arabs resided in
cities or garrison towns, and minimal conversion efforts did not change existing religious beliefs.
Indian Influences on Islamic Civilization. Although Islam's impact in India was minimal, Islamic
civilization was enriched by Indian culture. Indian achievements in science, mathematics,, medicine,
music, and astronomy passed to the Arabs. Indian numerals were accepted, later to pass to Europe as
"Arabic" numerals. Colonies of Arabs settled along India's coasts, adopted local customs, and provided
staging points for later Islamic expansion to island and mainland Southeast India.
From Booty to Empire: The Second Wave of Muslim Invasions. After the initial Muslim conquests,
internal divisions weakened Muslim rule and allowed limited Hindu reconquest. In the 10th century a
Turkish dynasty gained power in Afghanistan. Its third ruler, Mahmud of Ghazni, began two centuries of
incursions into northern India. In the 12th century the Persian Muhammad of Ghur created an extensive
state in the Indus valley and north-central India. Later campaigns extended it along the plains of the
Ganges to Bengal. A lieutenant to Muhammad, Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, later formed a new state, with its
capital at Delhi on the Ganges plain. The succeeding dynasties, the sultans of Delhi, were military states;
their authority was limited by factional strife and dependence upon Hindu subordinates. They ruled much
of north-central India for the next 300 years.
Patterns of Conversion . Although Muslims came as conquerors, interaction with Indians early was
dominated by peaceful exchanges. The main carriers of Islam were traders and Sufi mystics, the latter
drawing followers because of similarities to Indian holy men. Their mosques and schools became centers
of regional political power providing protection to local populations. Low and outcast Hindus were
welcomed. Buddhists were the most numerous converts. Buddhist spiritual decline had debased its
practices and turned interest to the vigorous new religion of Islam. Others converted to escape taxes or
through intermarriage. Muslim migrants fleeing 13th and 14th century Mongol incursions also increased
the Islamic community.
Patterns of Accommodation. In most regions Islam initially had little impact on the general Hindu
community. High-caste Hindus did not accept the invaders as their equals. Although serving as
administrators or soldiers, they remained socially aloof, living in separate quarters and not intermarrying.
Hindus thought the Muslims, as earlier invaders, would be absorbed by Hindu society. Muslim
communities did adopt many Indian ways; they accepted Hindu social hierarchies, foods, and attitudes
toward women.
Islamic Challenge and Hindu Revival. Muslims, despite Indian influences, held to the tenets of Islam.
The Hindu response, open to all individuals and castes led to an increased emphasis on devotional cults of
gods and goddesses (bhakti). The cults, open to men, women, and castes, stressed the importance of
strong emotional bonds to the gods. Mira Bai, a low-caste woman, and Kabir, a Muslim weaver,
composed songs and poems in regional languages accessible to common people. Reaching a state of
ecstatic unity brought removal of all past sins and rendered caste distinctions meaningless. Shiva, Vishnu,
and the goddess Kali were the most worshipped gods. The movement helped, especially among low-caste
groups, to stem conversion to Islam.
Stand-off: The Muslim Presence in India at the End of the Sultanate Period. Similarities in style and
message between Sufis and bhaktic devotees led to attempts to bridge the gaps between Islam and
Hinduism. The orthodox of each faith repudiated such thought. Brahmins denounced Muslims as temple
destroyers and worked for reconversion to Hinduism. Muslim ulama stressed the incompatibility of
Islam's principles with Hindu beliefs. By the close of the sultanate period there were two distinct religious
communities. The great majority of the population remained Hindu. They were convinced of the
superiority of Indian religion and civilization, and of its capability to absorb the Muslim invaders. South
Asia remained the least converted and integrated of all areas receiving the message of Islam.
The Spread of Islam to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia had been a middle ground where the Chinese
part of the Eurasian trading complex met the Indian Ocean zone. By the 7th and 8th centuries southeast
Asian sailors and ships were active in the trade. When Muslims, from the 8th century, gained control of
Indian commerce, Islamic culture reached Southeast Asia. The 13th century collapse of the trading
empire of Shrivijaya, ruled by devout Buddhists and located on the Straits of Malacca and northern
Sumatra, made possible large-scale, peaceful, Muslim entry.
Trading Contacts and Conversion. Peaceful contacts and voluntary conversion were more important to
the spread of Islam than conquest and force. Trading contacts prepared the way for conversion, with the
process carried forward by Sufis. The first conversions occurred in small northern Sumatran ports. On
the mainland the key to the spread of Islam was the city of Malacca, the smaller successor to Shrivijaya.
From Malacca Islam went to Malaya, Sumatra, and the state of Demak on Java's north coast. Islam spread
into Java and moved on to the Celebes and Mindanao in the Philippines. Coastal cities were the most
receptive to Islam. Their conversion linked them to a Muslim system connected to the principal Indian
Ocean ports. Buddhist dynasties were present in many regions, but since Buddhist conversions were
limited to the elite, the mass of the population was open to the massage of Sufis. The island of Bali and
mainland Southeast Asia, where Buddhism had gained popular support, remained impervious to Islam.
Sufi Mystics and the Nature of Southeast Asian Islam. The mystical quality of Islam in Southeast Asia
was due to Sufi strivings. They often were tolerant of the indigenous peoples’ Buddhist and Hindu
beliefs. Converts retained pre-Islamic practices, especially for regulating social interaction. Islamic law
ruled legal transactions. Women held a stronger familial and societal position than they had in the Middle
East or India. They dominated local markets, while in some regions matrilineal descent persisted. Many
pre-Muslim beliefs were incorporated into Islamic ceremonies.
In Depth: Conversion and Accommodation in the Spread of World Religions. Great civilizations and
world religions have been closely associated throughout world history. World religions, belief structures
that flourish in many differing cultures, have to possess a spiritual core rich enough to appeal to potential
converts. They have to possess core beliefs that allow adherents to maintain a sense of common identity,
but also must be flexible enough to allow retention of important aspects of local culture. The capacity for
accommodation allowed Islam, and later Christianity, to spread successfully into many differing
communities.
Conclusion: The Legacy of the Abbasid Age. Despite the political instability of the Abbasids, Islam's
central position in global history was solidified. The expanding Muslim world linked ancient civilizations
through conquest and commercial networks. Islam was the civilizer of nomadic peoples in Asia and
Africa. Its cultural contributions diffused widely from great cities and universities. There were, however,
tendencies that placed Muslims at a disadvantage in relation to rival civilizations, particularly to their
European rivals. Political divisions caused exploitable weaknesses in many regions. Most importantly,
the increasing intellectual rigidity of the ulama caused Muslims to become less receptive to outside
influences at a time when the European world transformed its culture and power.
KEY TERMS
al-Mahdi: 3rd Abbasid caliph (775-785); failed to reconcile Shi’i moderates to his dynasty and to resolve
the succession problem.
Harun al-Rashid: most famous of the Abbasid caliphs (786-809); renowned for sumptuous and costly
living recounted in The Thousand and One Nights;.
Buyids: Persian invaders of the 10th century; captured Baghdad; and as sultans through Abbasid
figureheads.
Seljuk Turks: nomadic invaders from central Asia; staunch Sunnis; ruled from the 11th century in the
name of the Abbasids.
Crusades: invasions of western Christians into Muslim lands, especially Palestine; captured Jerusalem
and established Christian kingdoms enduring until 1291.
Saladin: 12th century Muslim ruler; reconquered most of the Crusader kingdoms.
Ibn Khaldun: Great Muslim historian; author of The Muqaddimah; sought to
uncover persisting patterns in Muslim dynastic history
Rubiyat: epic of Omar Khayyam; seeks to find meaning in life and a path to union with the divine.
Shah-Nama: epic poem written by Firdawsi in the late 10th and early 11th centuries; recounts the history
of Persia to the era of Islamic conquests.
Sa’di: a great poet of the Abbasid era.
al-Razi: classified all matter as animal, vegetable, and mineral.
al-Biruni: 11th century scientist; calculated the specific weight of major minerals.
ulama: Islamic religious scholars; pressed for a more conservative and restrictive theology; opposed to
non-Islamic thinking.
al-Ghazali: brilliant Islamic theologian; attempted to fuse Greek and Quranic traditions.
Sufis: Islamic mystics; spread Islam to many Afro-Asian regions.
Mongols: central Asian nomadic peoples; captured Baghdad in 1258 and killed the last Abbasid caliph.
Muhammad ibn Qasim: Arab general who conquered Sind; and made it part of the Umayyad Empire.
Arabic numerals: Indian numerical notation brought by the Arabs to the West.
Harsha: 7th century north Indian ruler; built a large state that declined after his death in 646.
Mahmud of Ghazni: 3rd ruler of a dynasty in Afghanistan; invaded northern India during the 11th
century..
Muhammad of Ghur: Persian ruler of a small kingdom in Afghanistan; invaded and conquered much of
northern India.
Qutb-ud-din Aibak: lieutenant of Muhammad of Ghur; established kingdom in India with the capital at
Delhi.
sati: Hindu ritual for burning widows with their deceased husbands.
bhaktic cults: Hindu religious groups who stressed the importance of strong emotional bonds between
devotees and the gods or goddesses - especially Shiva, Vishnu, and Kali .
Mir Bai: low-caste, woman poet and song-writer in bhaktic cults.
Kabir: 15th century Muslim mystic who played down the differences between Hinduism and Islam.
Shrivijaya: trading empire based on the Malacca straits; its Buddhist government resisted Muslim
missionaries; when it fell southeastern Asia was opened to Islam.
Malacca: flourishing trading city in Malaya; established a trading empire after the fall of Shrivijaya.
Demak: most powerful of the trading states on the north Java coast; converted to Islam and served as a
dissemination point to other regions.
LECTURE SUGGESTIONS
1. Compare and contrast the initial spread of Islam throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle
East with the Islamic incursions into India and Southeast Asia. Most of the first expansion in the
Mediterranean region and the Middle East was by Arabian tribesmen. The government under the
Umayyads retained the initial concept of rule by a small Arab elite; full citizenship for mawali was
denied. The Abbasids gave full citizenship to non-Arabs. The second stage of Islamic expansion was led
by non-Arabs. The presence of Sufi missionaries made for a more peaceful expansion and to less
restrictive forms of Islam. Converts, as in the Delhi sultanate, retained many of their previous Hindu
beliefs and social systems.
2. Discuss the political, cultural, and economic characteristics of the Abbasid Empire. In political
organization the Abbasids suffered from a loss of central authority and a growth of regional dynasties.
There were many revolts by Shi'i, mercenary armies, and peasants. The dynasty crumbled from the
invasions of Buyids, Seljuk Turks, and Mongols. The Abbasid economy depended on agriculture and
trade. Agriculture required irrigation and this failed under the later dynasty. Cities grew and prospered;
long-distance trade reached into India and Southeast Asia. In culture the Abbasids were the zenith of
Islamic civilization, with advances in science, literature, mathematics, and philosophy.
CLASS DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What were the causes for the weaknesses of the later Abbasid Empire?
2. What was the position of women in the Abbasid Empire?
3. Describe the economy of the later Abbasid Empire.
4. Discuss theological developments within Islam during the Abbasid Empire.
5. Discuss the stages of Islamic incursion into India.
6. To what extent were Muslims successful in converting Indians to Islam?
THE INSTRUCTOR'S TOOL KIT
Map References
Danzer, Discovering World History Through Maps and Views
Source Maps: S23-24. Reference Maps: R24, R28.
Audio Cassettes
The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam (the 4th translation). Caedmon
Documents
The Koran and the Family
The Islamic Religion
Religious and Political Organization in the Islamic Middle East
Islamic Culture
Recapturing the African Religious Tradition
In Stearns, op. cit.
Video/Film
The Five Pillars of Islam. Films for the Humanities and Sciences, #SQ708
Islamic Science and Technology. Films for the Humanities and Sciences, #SQ712
Christians, Jews, and Moslems in Medieval Spain. Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, #CN-1958
The Story of Islam. Filmic Archives
The Sindbad Voyage. Films for the Humanities and Sciences, #KT42~92

1
1
Middle Ages in Europe
The Dark and Middle Ages in Europe cover the period from 476 to 1400 CE. After
the collapse of the western Roman Empire in 476 CE, the Dark Ages set in, and
cultural studies in all areas disappeared. Europe was divided between the
Visigoths from north Germany, the Vandals from north Africa, the Franks who
ruled France and part of Germany as well as the Saxons from Germany who ruled
Britain. Central governments were replaced by small feudal districts and city life
deteriorated. Pope Leo III separated the Roman Church from the Byzantine
Church. He also made Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor in 800, temporarily
unifying Europe. From 814 to 1042 there were Viking invasions of coastal Europe,
England and Russia.
European society was organized under the Feudal System. There were three
estates, or classes: nobles, priests and serfs. The economy was based on
agriculture which was run through small manors. The serfs did the work and were
protected by a hierarchy of nobles who did the fighting. Crusades from 1096 to
1260 resulted in the capture of Israel, Lebanon and Syria from the Moslems who
recaptured this territory and drove out the European invaders. The Crusades led
to the growth of trade. Towns developed through fairs, and trades were organized
into guilds. Their inhabitants were free men. Plagues were frequent. The worst
one, the Black Death, killed over half of Europe’s population in the 1340s.
2
The Magyar invasion of western Europe ended in 955 with their defeat by Otto the
Great at the Battle of Lechfeld. In 1241 the Mongols conquered eastern Europe but
withdrew to fight over the succession when Ogedei Khan died. The most notable
example of the constant fighting in Europe began with the conquest of England by
William of Normandy in 1066. By 1152, Henry III controlled England and 2/3 of
France. However, in the Hundred Years War (1362 – 1453) England was driven out
of France.
The only vestiges of intellectual life in the Dark Ages were in Church monastery
schools based on the quadrivium, four elementary texts written by the Roman
Boethius ca 500 CE on arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. For example,
there is a ten times table in the arithmetic text and the geometry text does not
include the Pythagorean theorem which became unknown in Europe. Basically, no
European knew any significant mathematics and there were no copies of Greek
mathematical works in any language. Arithmetic only involved integers and the four
basic operations. Division was done ad hoc, there were no algorithms. Fractions
were rarely used, and irrational numbers were never mentioned. Good calculators
were called practitioners of the black art (magic). The lack of interest in mathematics
until 1100 resulted from a religious emphasis on the spiritual with no interest in the
physical world. This originated with St. Augustine (Italy, 4th century CE):
“Whatever knowledge man has acquired outside of Holy Writ, if it be harmful
it is therefore condemned; if it be wholesome it is there contained.”
Moslems had a similar attitude with regard to the Koran during their initial conquests,
but this attitude changed rapidly to encourage secular learning.
2
3
From 1100 CE onwards is called the Middle Ages. European society became stable,
towns grew and industry began. There were contacts with Moslems and the
Byzantine Empire from growing trade, the Crusades (1096 to 1260 CE) and the long
slow conquest of Spain. Europeans heard about Greek works and Arabic texts.
Over a 200 year period many of these texts were translated into Latin. (See the table
on page 327 of the text.) Many Arabic texts were translated by Jews in Spain from
Arabic to Spanish and then by Christians from Spanish to Latin. However, it took
hundreds of years to assimilate the information in these difficult texts since there
were no competent European teachers. In particular, the Indian-Islam base ten
decimal number system was slow to replace Roman numerals.
European intellectual life eventually developed at universities after the Renaissance.
The university at Bologna was founded in 1088 and the universities at Paris, Salerno,
Oxford and Cambridge were established shortly before 1200. They were initially
dominated by the Church with no academic freedom. The curriculum consisted of the
trivium (logic, grammar, rhetoric) which focused on Aristotle and on Boethius’
quadrivium. Excerpts from Euclid, Ptolemy’s Almagest and methods for practical
calculations were also studied. The standard scholarly language in Europe was Latin
which allowed communication across the continent. From the Middle Ages through
the Renaissance this university learning, called scholasticsm, was a blend of
Christian theology and Greek ideas, based on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas
(1225 – 1274). It focused on certain Greek texts and the Bible while rejecting
experimentation and observation. Church doctrine and Aristotle were accepted as
absolute truths.
4
Roger Bacon (1214 – 1294) argued against blindly accepting Aristotle’s theories in
science and was placed under house arrest for a couple of years. He was the
forerunner of empiricism and the scientific method, approaches which developed in
the renaissance.
The main deterrents to scholarly activity in the Middle Ages were:
1. the large number of small states;
2. the lack of availability and high cost of texts which were hand written in Latin;
3. Church control and censorship;
4. the large loss of life and assets in frequent wars and the Crusades;
5. the Black Death which killed over half the population of Europe in the 1340s.
There were two areas of progress in the Middle Ages. Jordanus de Nemore
(ca 1220) learned math by reading Latin translations of Arabic texts. He wrote the
Arithmetica in Latin using Euclid’s style. It included Euclid’s results on algebra and
number theory as well as more recent algebraic results and some original ones. He
ignored the Islam approach, rejecting irrational numbers and using Euclid’s
distinction between numbers and magnitudes. The Arithmetica also marked the first
appearance of Pascal’s triangle in Europe. Jordanus was the first person since
Diophantus to use symbols in algebraic computations. He was also the first to use
more than one variable but used words for operations and Roman numerals for
numbers. This notation developed in the Renaissance into modern mathematical
algebraic notation.
3
5
The interpretation of ratios as fractions was begun by Thomas Bradwardine (1295 –
1349) at Merton College of Oxford. However, he followed the Greek viewpoint of
only allowing fractions of quantities of the same kind. In particular, he would not
allow the statement “velocity equals distance divided by time”. He did, however,
present the modern procedures for multiplying and dividing fractions. Nicole
Oresme (1320 – 1382) of the University of Paris developed rules which we would
interpret as doing arithmetic with fractional exponents.
The only significant new mathematics of the Middle Ages was the study of
kinematics in the 14th century. It began in Merton College of Oxford in 1335 with
William Heytesbury’s definition of instantaneous velocity and his proof of the mean
speed rule for a body moving with constant acceleration:
s = ½ (vi + vf)(tf – ti ).
Following Aristotle, velocity, being a magnitude, was depicted by a line segment.
In the 1350s Nicole Oresme carried these ideas further. His advances include:
(1) basic formulas for motion under constant acceleration;
(2) the depiction of velocity as a function of time;
(3) the graph of the velocity function;
(4) the identification of the area under a linear velocity graph as the distance
traveled.
6
Example 1 (a) Oresme’s depiction of of v(t) the velocity of an object at time t.
(b) Oresme’s graph of an object moving with constant velocity.
(c) Oresme’s graph of an object moving with constant acceleration.
Oresme proves the mean speed rule from the velocity graph in (c). The area
under this graph is the area of the trapezoid with bases vi, vf and height tf – ti
which is ½ (vi + vf)(tf – ti). This area is the distance traveled under constant
acceleration.
Note Oreseme’s early use of functions and their graphs. Oresme’s ideas were
largely ignored until they reappeared 200 years later in the kinematics of
Galileo, 275 years later in the analytic geometry of Fermat, Descartes and
300 years later in Newton’s Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
(a) (b) (c)
t
v(t) v
ti tf ti tf tf – ti
vi
vf
4
7
In addition, Oresme initiated the first advances in infinite series since Archimedes.
He summed geometric series and a few nongeometric series. He also showed that
the harmonic series diverges. This was the first example of a divergent series whose
terms have limit zero.
Example 2 The geometric series with initial term A/K and ratio 1 – 1/K, for K ≥ 1, has
sum A.
Example 3 The harmonic series diverges.
Solution Oresme observed that the 2nth partial sum is greater than ½ plus the 2n–1th
partial sum. Hence the limit of the increasing sequence of partial sums is infinite.
Example 4 (Richard Swineshead, Merton College,1350) The series has sum 2.
Conclusion
In 1300 C.E. China, India, the Islam world and Europe were at approximately the same
mathematical level. Why did modern mathematics develop in Europe? There were
inhibiting forces in all four cultures.
In China, mathematics was dominated by the government’s emphasis on training
bureaucrats to efficiently perform standard algorithms. Consequently there was no
incentive to innovate. Individuals with original ideas were isolated.

n1 2
n
n
8
In India, mathematical activity declined after 1200. They emphasized calculation,
rather than theory, calling mathematics ganita, the science of calculation. Kline,
citing the Persian historian al-Biruni ca. 1000, claims Indians lacked mathematical
values. They gave equal value to their own innovations and to crude outdated
Babylonian and Egyptian methods. A simpler and fairer explanation may be that
the violence of Mongol invasions and the conflicts between Hindus and Moslems
created a poor atmosphere for mathematical innovation.
In the Islam world, mathematics was encouraged, flourished and developed until
1300 through the encouragement of religious leaders and civil rulers. Then they
began to fear science as possibly subversive to Islam and distinguished between
“foreign sciences” and “religious sciences”. Unfortunately, mathematics was
classified as a foreign science. Consequently, government support and popular
interest fell dramatically.
In Europe, there was no tradition of mathematics and no government support for
its development. In addition, the Church discouraged new ideas as subversive.
However wealth, accumulated from trade, financed and encouraged an intellectual
revolution, called the Renaissance, which laid the basis for mathematical
breakthroughs. Simultaneously, the Catholic Church gradually lost its influence
culminating in the 16th century Reformation with the disintegration of the Church
into Protestant sects in northern Europe and Catholic countries in southern
Europe.

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE (SACRUM ROMANUM IMPERIUM, HEILIGES RÖMISCHES REICH)
The deposition of Romulus Augustulus had terminated the Western Roman Empire in 476, and in
legal fiction all imperial authority now passed to the Eastern Roman emperors ruling from Constantinople.
Over the next three centuries Rome came under increasing papal authority, which clashed with that of the
distant emperor on various theological and political grounds. This widening rift, coupled with the pope’s
repeated reliance on the Carolingian kings of the Franks for protection against rivals in Italy, led to Pope
Leo III’s coronation of the Frankish king Charles I (Charlemagne) as emperor at Rome in 800. This constituted
a translatio imperii from the Romans to the Carolingians and their successors. This renewed empire came to be
called Holy Empire (Sacrum Imperium) by 1157, Holy Roman Empire (Sacrum Romanum Imperium) by 1254,
and Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae) by 1450.
The imperial succession was perceived as at least partly subject to election (corresponding to both
Roman and Frankish notions of charismatic monarchy). Even when a designated and unchallenged successor
was available, imperial status had to be conferred by the pope, although the second and third emperors were
actually first crowned by their respective fathers. Therefore, until crowned by the pope, a monarch remained
only king of the Franks or, in later German medieval practice, “king of the Romans.” With the disintegration of
the Carolingian empire and the extinction of the male line of Carolingian monarchs in Italy (875), the imperial
title passed, with several interruptions, to rulers of the West Franks (“France” 875–877), the East Franks
(“Germany” 881–887 and 896–899), and various Italian potentates (891–924). After a hiatus of almost four
decades, in 962 Pope Ioannes XII crowned the German king Otto I (936–973) emperor. From this point on
the imperial title remained connected with kingdom of Germany, although several German kings failed to secure
an imperial coronation (most notably in the period 1250–1308). Administratively speaking, the empire was
now composed of the kingdoms of Germany, Italy, and (from 1032) Burgundy, all ruled in personal union by
the successors of Otto I. (The duchy of Bohemia was made a hereditary kingdom in 1198 but it was not ruled
in personal union with the older constituent kingdoms except by dynastic inheritance.)
Starting with the Investiture Controversy between Emperor Heinrich IV (1056–1105) and Pope
Gregorius VII, the de facto hereditary succession was undermined, and the state evolved into an elective
monarchy in spite of the efforts of the Hohenstaufen (1138–1254). Subsequently the right to elect an emperor
became vested in a limited number of secular and ecclesiastic princes, an arrangement crystallized in the Golden
Bull of Emperor Karl IV (1346–1378) from 1356. During the reign of Ludwig V (IV as emperor, 1314–1347)
it was decided that the elected king of Germany may use the imperial title even if the pope refused to crown him
emperor. This decision was put into practice in 1508, when Maximilian I (1493–1519) assumed the imperial
title at Trent and decreed that a monarch was emperor from the time of his election; Karl V (1519–1556) was
the last to bother with a papal coronation (1530). The Habsburg dynasty monopolized the throne from 1438.
The Protestant Reformation and the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) further eroded imperial authority over the
German principalities, as it provided local rulers with the freedom of choosing between Catholicism and
Lutheranism as the religion of their subjects. The last vestiges of actual imperial power as such were swept away
by the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Franz II took the title emperor of Austria in
1804, and in 1806 abdicated as Holy Roman emperor.
The neo-Roman emperors were called Imperator and Augustus in Latin and Kaiser in German. The
kings of the Franks were designated as rex Francorum, but by the 11th century they were called Romanorum rex
until crowned emperor by the pope. The list below includes all monarchs crowned (until 1530) or elected (from
1508) as Roman emperors in the west; after 1519 the reigns of emperors-elect correspond entirely with their
reigns as Roman kings. Roman kings who did not secure an imperial coronation before 1508 are not listed.
Indicated periods of kingship exclude association on the throne, and from 1039 they combine the titles to the
German, Italian, and Burgundian kingdoms. The names of emperors are presented in standard Latin forms.
Emperors of the Romans
Carolingian House
800–814 Carolus I, the Great 1… son of king Pépin of the Franks; Franks 768–814; Italy 774–781
814–833 Ludovicus I, the Pious … son of Carolus I; associated 813; also Franks; Italy 818–820; deposed
833–834 Lotharius I … son of Ludovicus I; associated 817; Italy 820–839; deposed
834–840 Ludovicus I, the Pious … restored; also Franks
840–855 Lotharius I … restored; Middle Francia 843–855
1 Canonized as saint 1165.
855–875 Ludovicus II … son of Lotharius I; associated 850; Italy 839–875; Provence 863–875
875–877 Carolus II, the Bald … son of Ludovicus I; France 843–877; Italy and Provence 875–877
881–887 Carolus III, the Fat … son of king Ludwig II of Germany, son of Ludovicus I; Germany
876–887; Italy 879–887; France 884–887; deposed, died 888
Guidonid House of Spoleto
891–894 Guido … son of duke Guido I of Spoleto, son of duke Lamberto I by daughter of king
Pipino of Italy, son of Carolus I; Italy 889–891
894–898 Lambertus … son of Giudo; associated 892; Italy 891–898
Carolingian House
896–899 Arnulphus, of Carinthia … bastard son of king Karlmann II of Germany, brother of Carolus III;
Germany 887–899; Italy 896
Bosonid House of Metz
901–905 Ludovicus III, the Blind … son of king Boson of Provence by Ermengarda, daughter of
Ludovicus II; Provence 887–928; Italy 900–905; deposed, died 928
Unruochid House of Friuli
915–924 Berengarius … son of duke Everardo of Friuli by Gisella, daughter of Ludovicus I; Italy 888–924
Liudolfing House of Saxony
962–973 Otto I, the Great … son of king Heinrich I of Germany; Germany 936–973; Italy 963–973
973–983 Otto II, the Red … son of Otto I; associated 967; also Germany and Italy
996–1002 Otto III … son of Otto I; Germany and Italy 983–1002
1014–1024 Henricus II, the Holy 2… son of duke Heinrich II of Bavaria, son of duke Heinrich I,
brother of Otto I; Germany and Italy 1002–1024
Salian House of Franconia
1027–1039 Conradus II 3… son of count Heinrich of Speyer, son of duke Otto I of Carinthia, son of
duke Konrad I of Lorraine by Liudgard, daughter of Otto I; Germany and Italy 1024–
1039; Burgundy 1032–1039
1046–1056 Henricus III, the Black … son of Conradus II; king 1039–1056
1183–1105 Henricus IV … son of Henricus III; king 1056–1105; deposed, died 1106
1111–1125 Henricus V … son of Henricus IV; king 1105–1125
House of Supplinburg
1133–1137 Lotharius II … son of count Gebhard of Supplinburg; king 1125–1137
Hohenstaufen House of Swabia
1155–1190 Fridericus I, Barbarossa … son of duke Friedrich II of Swabia; king 1152–1190
1191–1197 Henricus VI … son of Fridericus I; king 1190–1197
Welf House of Brunswick
1209–1215 Otto IV … son of duke Heinrich III of Saxony, son of duke Heinrich II by Gertrud,
daughter of Lotharius II; king 1208–1215; deposed, died 1218
Hohenstaufen House of Swabia
1220–1250 Fridericus II … son of Henricus VI; king 1197–1198 and 1215–1250; Sicily 1197–1250
House of Luxemburg
1312–1313 Henricus VII … son of count Henri VI of Luxembourg; king 1308–1313
House of Wittelsbach (Bavaria)
1328–1347 Ludovicus IV … son of duke Ludwig II of Upper Bavaria; king 1314–1347
House of Luxemburg (Bohemia)
1355–1378 Carolus IV … son of king Jan of Bohemia, son of Henricus VII; king 1347–1378; Bohemia
1346–1378
1433–1437 Sigismundus … son of Carolus IV; king 1410–1437; Hungary 1387–1437; Bohemia 1419–1437
2 Canonized as saint 1146; the numbering of emperors named Henricus includes king Heinrich I of Germany
(919–936).
3 The numbering of emperors named Conradus includes king Konrad I of Germany (911–918)
House of Habsburg (Austria)
1452–1493 Fridericus III … son of duke Ernst of Styria; king 1440–1493
1508–1519 Maximilianus I … son of Fridericus III; king 1493–1519
1519–1556 Carolus V … son of king Felipe I of Castile, son of Maximilianus I; crowned 1530; Spain
1516–1556; Naples and Sicily 1516–1554; abdicated, died 1558
1558–1564 Ferdinandus I … brother of Carolus V; king 1556–1564; Bohemia and Hungary 1526–1564
1564–1576 Maximilianus II … son of Ferdinandus I; also Bohemia and Hungary
1576–1612 Rudolphus II 4… son of Maximilianus II; also Bohemia and Hungary
1612–1619 Matthias … son of Maximilianus II; also Bohemia and Hungary
1619–1637 Ferdinandus II … son of duke Karl of Styria, son of Ferdinandus I; also Bohemia and Hungary
1637–1657 Ferdinandus III … son of Ferdinandus II; also Bohemia and Hungary
1658–1705 Leopoldus I … son of Ferdinandus III; also Bohemia and Hungary
1705–1711 Iosephus I … son of Leopoldus I; also Bohemia and Hungary
1711–1740 Carolus VI … son of Leopoldus I; also Bohemia and Hungary
House of Wittelsbach (Bavaria)
1742–1745 Carolus VII … son of elector Maximilian II of Bavaria; husband of Maria Amalie, daughter
of Iosephus I
House of Habsburg-Lorraine (Austria)
1745–1765 Franciscus I … son of duke Léopold-Joseph of Lorraine; husband of Maria Theresia,
daughter of Carolus VI
1765–1790 Iosephus II … son of Franciscus I; Bohemia and Hungary 1780–1790
1790–1792 Leopoldus II … son of Franciscus I; also Bohemia and Hungary
1792–1806 Franciscus II … son of Leopoldus II; abdicated; Bohemia and Hungary 1792–1835; emperor
of Austria 1804–1835
(dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire 1806)
4 The numbering of emperors named Rudolphus includes king Rudolf I of Germany (1273–1291).

57
Imperialism, colonialism and cartography
JEFFREY C. STONE
Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB9 2UF
Revised MS received 9 March, 1987
ABSTRACT
The centenary of the Berlin conference of 1884-85 was an opportunity for historians to reiterate the view that the
conference was not convened to partition Africa. It follows from the imperial function of the conference that subsequent
colonialism was a short-lived aberration in four centuries of a continuing imperial relationship between Europe and Africa.
The established attributes which differentiate imperialism from colonialism provide a framework for understanding the
cartographic evolution of Africa. The long-standing view of an eighteenth century cartographic reformation of Africa is
challenged. Pre-colonial cartography of Africa is, instead, characterized by methodological continuity, which is still evident
in the cartography of the nineteenth century European explorers, whereas the major discontinuity coincides with the
beginnings of colonial rule. The cartographic requirements for the implementation of colonial rule on the ground are
different from those which foster a more remote imperial relationship. The attributes of imperial cartography are now
reasserting themselves in the post-colonial period.
KEY WORDS. Africa, Reinterpretation of evidence, Cartography, Imperialism, Colonialism, Exploration
Erroneous interpretations of historical events tend to
persist, despite the best efforts of historians to rectify
matters. In looking at the origins of colonialism in
Africa, cartographic historians as well as historical
and political geographers seem unaware of the
interpretation which diplomatic historians now place
on a famous nineteenth century meeting. The consequence
for cartographic historiography is that a
significant change in the characteristic content of the
evolving cartography of Africa has been overlooked,
whilst the nature and origins of an earlier phase
of change has been misunderstood. If ‘European
pre-eminence in cartography and map-making determined
what constitutes Africa, regardless of cultural
history (Mazrui, 1986, p. 101), then the continent’s
cartographic history is no mundane or esoteric
subject.
The meeting in question is the fourteen-power
Berlin conference on Africa of 1884-85, whose centenary
was recently marked by at least six academic
conferences. Fierce controversy was aroused by the
announcement of some of these events, which were
erroneously seen as celebrating the anniversary of the
launching of colonial partition (Hargreaves, 1984),
but historians of Africa have long been at pains to
emphasize that the Berlin Conference did not mark
the beginnings of partition (Crowder, 1968; Fage,
1969; Hargreaves, 1974). The Berlin Conference was
convened because collaborative arrangements on
which European states had hitherto relied were beginning
to break down (Hargreaves, 1985a). Continued
commercial access to Africa was the common objective,
not control of its territory. What has been
described as ‘the old system of free trade imperialism
in West Africa’ was threatened (Hargreaves, 1985b,
p. 21). Admittedly, the conference proved ineffective
in constraining the champions of partition. The Berlin
provisions proved inadequate, as the devices of
treaty and protectorate were perforce utilized to
obtain control inland, but the recognition of the
Berlin conference as a meeting of imperialists not
colonialists and the identification of the differing attributes
of imperialism and colonialism has significance
for our understanding of the cartographic evolution
of Africa, which requires reappraisal.
The term ‘imperialism’ has come to mean the
control of the weak by the rich and powerful, not
necessarily by means of the exercise of direct authority.
It is an appropriate term for the long-standing
relationship between Europe and Africa which the
Berlin Conference was convened to defend, that is
the traditional free-trading system at the coasts of the
Trans. Inst. Geogr. N.S. 13: 57-64 (1988) ISSN: 0020-2754 Printed in Great Britain
58 JEFFREY C. STONE
continent. The freedom was for Europeans to compete
for trade, not for Africans to obstruct it (Hargreaves,
1984) and the imperial relationship was essentially
international in character, being based on mutuality
of interests among European powers. The European
international imperialism which was promoted in
Berlin in 1884 is equally evident in the founding of
the International African Association at the Brussels
Geographical Conference in 1876 (Bridges, 1980) and
indeed it is a relationship which can be traced back
through at least four centuries. By contrast, the period
of direct European colonial rule which began nevertheless
in the 1890s and which is differentiated by
parochial European nationalism and exclusivity, can
be regarded as an abnormal and brief but influential
interlude in the imperial relationship between Africa
and Europe. The relatively ephemeral nature of
colonialism by contrast with imperialism in Africa is
emphasized by projecting forward to the postcolonial
period, for example to the successive
negotiations of the Lome Conventions between the
EEC and the largely African ACP states. Only tiny
residuals of European colonialism remain in Africa
but the very long standing imperial relationship is
arguably evolving. European imperialism in Africa is
characterized by collaborative internationalism and
historical continuity, whereas colonialism was a
relatively brief assertion of competitive European
nationalism. The difference has great significance
in understanding the cartographic evolution of
Africa.
Pre-colonial cartography of the interior of Africa
has long been seen as dividing into two distinct
phases, which are of debatable validity and which
obscure the reality of the forces operative. The earlier
phase is characterized by its use of Ptolemaic conceptions,
particularly for the source of the Nile, and is
epitomized by the eight-sheet map of Africa of 1564
by Gastaldi whose subsequent influence is apparent in
the depictions of Africa by Ortelius (1570), Speed
(1627), Blaeu (1642) and others. Supposedly, the
turning point in the cartography of Africa is located in
the ‘Age of Reason’, in the maps of the French school,
notably De L’Isle (1700) and d’Anville (1727) (Tooley,
1969). A scientific approach lead to the removal of
many legends and assumptions by the innovators
who achieved marked gains in accuracy and were
famous for their blank spaces (Lane-Poole, 1950;
Klemp, 1968; Tooley, Bricker and Crone, 1976;
Wallis, 1986) which are allegedly indicative of a
scientific attitude of mind. But contemporary wisdom
about the interior of Africa was set aside in favour of
blank spaces as early as 1666 by Vossius (Randles,
1956), while the Ptolemaic tradition of Africa was
itself replete with blank spaces and the use of the
word ‘incognita’.
Sixteenth and seventeenth century cartography
employed such contemporary sources as were available
and made significant changes in the depiction of
Africa (Ouwinga, 1975) in the same way that James
MacQueen (1856) made substantial changes to the
map of Central Africa in the nineteenth century, albeit
with different subject matter and quality of data. Just
as Almeida was critical of previous depictions of
Ethiopia in the seventeenth century (Skelton, 1958),
so eighteenth century cartographers reacted to the
work of their predecessors, given new sources to
hand. There is methodological continuity linking
eighteenth century and both earlier and later
cartographers,
The critical circumstances for methodological continuity
in the mapping of Africa over four centuries by
cartographers from several European countries was
movement of information about Africa within Europe.
Certainly, commercial competition meant that the
navigational information of the Dutch, for example,
remained secret (Ouwinga, 1975). Nevertheless, original
information about Africa did disseminate within
Europe under the commercial impetus of publication.
Perhaps the most striking example, which challenges
the conception of the eighteenth century French
school as innovatory in its critical attitudes or its
sources, and also demonstrates the manner in which
information disseminated for commercial gain, is the
1665 Portuguese Atlas of Africa by Joao Teixeira
Albernaz II. The atlas was commissioned by a
Frenchman and together with other Portuguese
source material, it was used to transform previous
depictions of the Zambezi basin by Jaillot (1678) a
Frenchman, by Berry (1680) an Englishman and by
Coronelli (168.3) a Venetion, in their maps of Africa,
before inspiring De L’Isle and d’Anville (Cortesão
and da Mota, 1960). In the past, the commercial and
strategic divisions within Europe have been stressed
in seeking to comprehend the evolving early cartography
of Africa, but it is the facility with which
Portuguese information disseminated throughout
Europe in the form of the printed map which is
striking. This is understandable, given the essentially
collaborative nature of European imperialism towards
Africa.
The pre-colonial cartographic depiction of Africa
represents evolution not transformation. The concept
of an eighteenth century reformation derives from
Imperialism and cartography 59
analysis of form, not process, that is from the external
for of the end product, the change of map content,
as ethnographic descriptions and perspective drawings
of hills were removed and as new information
lead to the abandonment of some long-standing
delineations of parts of the interior. It is in any case an
illusion. Those particular changes in content are not
exclusive to the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the
manner in which African maps were compiled in the
eighteenth century was little altered.
The great cartographic watershed for Africa relates
to the replacement of remote imperial influence with
direct colonial authority. In cartographic terms, the
transition is primarily a twentieth century process
which does not properly include the well known
maps of the interior of Africa by eighteenth and
nineteenth century European explorers. There is little
evidence of a direct connection between the explorations
of men such as Livingstone, Speke, Grant and
Stanley and the initiation of colonialism. Rather, the
connection is with the ‘unofficial mind’ (Bridges,
1982, p. 18) of imperialism which was located in the
commercial middle class of British society, in servicemen
and officials, businessmen and missionary
leaders, and in the membership of the African Association
which was founded in 1788 and quickly became
involved in the problem of the source, course and
termination of the Niger. The maps themselves were
based on instrumental observation which added a
scientific dimension to the travellers’ records, an
important ‘civilizing’ clement in legitimizing the
European penetration, presence and even interference
in Africa in the eyes of the unofficial mind. However,
the unofficial scramble for Africa by the commercial
and service classes was an imperial manifestation
to be differentiated from the subsequent and not
unrelated but more direct intervention by European
governments.
An archetypal example of a traveller in the imperialist
mould is Alfred Bertrand, a Swiss army captain
who was one of a four-man expedition of exploration
to north-west Rhodesia in 1895. Bertrand was to
become President of the Geographical Society of
Geneva and a Vice-President of the Ninth International
Geographical Congress in Geneva. He was a
member of ten European geographical societies,
mostly honorary, including the Royal Geographical
Society (Bertrand, 1926). The account of his travels
in north-west Rhodesia was published in French
(Bertrand, 1898) and English and includes the map
compiled by the Royal Geographical Society in
association with the lecture to the Society in 1897 by
the members of the expedition. As a Swiss national,
Bertrand could have had little interest in promoting
colonialism by his native land. As a result of his visit
to the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society station at
Sefula during the expedition, he in fact devoted a great
deal of time and effort throughout the remaining
twenty-seven years of his life to raising financial and
moral support throughout Europe for the Barotseland
and Basutoland missions. The detailed map of ‘The
Kingdom of the Marutse’ in his book (Fig. I), with its
many scientifically authentic latitudinal observations
inscribed on the map and its primary concern with
physical features (also mission stations) observed by
the travellers, is appropriate to the imperial (as
opposed to colonial) interests which Bertrand promoted
throughout Europe so philanthropically and
vigorously.
The cartographic transition from imperialism to
colonialism tends to lag behind the legal transformation.
Maps in the imperial mould continued to be
published into the colonial period, for example, maps
depicting the territory under the administration of the
British South Africa Company published by Edward
Stanford between 1895 and 1906. Although these
were compiled with the assistance of a company
who eventually came to govern all of Northern and
Southern Rhodesia, their function is primarily the
prosecution of commercial activities, as shown by the
many descriptive entries on the maps, extolling
the farming and ranching potential of various parts of
the country.
The great change to maps deriving from the colonial
rather than the imperial function is contemporaneous
with first efforts to establish administrations
on the ground, usually some short time after the
formal proclamation by the colonial authority. The
maps reflect the needs of the nascent administrative
systems, as is exemplified by the first District Officer
to be stationed in what was then the Balovale District
of northern Rhodesia, who refers to his first long
tour, as ‘trying to make a census of the people and a
map of the country’ (Venning, 1955, p. 55). His map
has none of the instrumentally-derived precision of
the earlier travellers in the region. It is inaccurate
(Stone, 1977) and its subject matter is predominantly
the location of the local populace. It was a functional
administrative tool and an example of a great many
colonial district maps (Stone, 1982) which locate rural
settlement in unprecedented detail.
The usual reason why professional Colonial
Survey Officers frequently did not compile the maps
necessary for the imposition of colonial rule was
6 0 ]EFFREY C. STONE
primarily that where they existed, they were fully
employed in the pressing task which also derived
necessitated a high order of professional expertise,
from the imposition of colonial authority but
namely cadastral mapping for the purposes of demarcating
townships and building plots, roads, railways,
Imperialism, colonialism and cartography 61
alienated land, reserved land and all of the other
boundaries that were a part of colonial imposition.
The importance of this second type of colonial map
which was a product of the change from imperial to
colonial control, IS evident from the necessity for
Colonial Surveys to resort to unsophisticated compilation
techniques in publishing early topographic
series (Stone, 1984), sometimes employing the
amateur work of the District Officer (Fig. 2). Overall,
progress on the provision of large scale topographic
map cover in British colonial Africa was slow. The
reason why the Federal Surveys of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland was able to publish such a large number of
large-scale topographic sheets of Northern and
Southern Rhodesia during its short life span from
1956 to 1964, was in part the paucity of coverage
achieved in the previous half century of colonial rule.
However, the association of colonial map making
with cadastral surveys at the expense of topographic
survey, is nowhere better demonstrated than in South
Africa. The method which Potter established in 1657
to record rights in land at the Cape (Fisher, 1984,
p. 58) IS still in use today, but the country made
little progress towards the provision of adequate
topographic cover until the reorganization of the
Trigonometrical Survey Office in 1936 (Liebenberg,
1979), long after the end of colonial rule.
A further differentiating factor between imperialism
and colonialism which is supported by the cartographic
evidence, is the removal of the international
dimension with the imposition of colonial rule. This is
recognized, for example, by McGrath (1976), whose
study of British East Africa specifically excludes the
German contribution to the mapping of its former
territory. The nationalistic parochialism of the colonial
period was carried to its ultimate in the decentralized
administrative system of former British Africa in
which territories were treated as separate and selfcontained
units (Jeffries, 1956). In consequence, there
is great variation between the former British territories
as to the amount and type of topographic mapping
which was carried out. For example, an early start on
topographic survey was made in Uganda by comparison
with Northern Rhodesia, although Uganda is
renowned for the very early Mailo Survey of
Buganda which was an experiment in land settlement
and exemplifies the pre-eminence of cadastral work in
the colonial period. Each European colonial power
went its own way in devising, or not devising, its
own programme of surveys and each British territory
did likewise.
If colonialism was a relatively brief aberration in
the prolonged and otherwise uninterrupted imperial
relationship between Europe and Africa, then sufficient
time should have elapsed by now for evidence
of the traits of imperialism to be reasserting
themselves. Debatably, the evidence is present in
the negotiations between the EEC and its African
Associates in the context of the Lomé Conventions.
Equally contentiously, there is cartographic evidence
deriving from the former Directorate of Overseas
Surveys (hereafter DOS), a colonial institution in
origin, which had assumed the broader role of an
agency for technical aid to overseas governments. As
McGrath (1983) demonstrates, there is continuity of
purpose in the relationship between DOS and firstly
the then dependencies of the UK, and eventually the
newly independent countries, continuity which was
in part a product of the local autonomy of the former
dependencies. Nevertheless, the changed nature of
the political relationship did bring about change in
the cartographic product, not unrelated to the reformation
of British aid policy after the creation of a
Ministry of Overseas Development in 1964. In the
post-independence period, the Directorate has of
course been obliged to take account of UK government
policy on aid in project selection. It is in this
context that changes in product must be seen, as for
example, in carrying out cadastral survey (once the
hallmark of colonial surveys and now of the surveys
of independent governments), most notably in
support of the scheme to resettle African small
holders on farms purchased from Europeans in the
Highlands of Kenya; or in the formation of the Land
Resources Division of DOS in 1964 to produce a
range of maps related to land use: or the successful
‘joint projects’ of DOS which were specifically
designed as vehicles for technology transfer. Then,
the extensive programmes of large scale topographic
mapping which were mounted by the Directorate
of Commonwealth Surveys (DCS) throughout large
parts of former British Africa in the years preceding
independence may be seen to have their origins in the
gradual reassertion of imperial policy over colonial
policy, to meet the needs of post-war Britain for
reliable sources of primary products in circumstances
of impending political change in Africa. It was this
writer’s experience that the colonial administrator on
the ground had little need of the topographic cover
which latterly became available. The significant
feature is not that one type of map is always to be
associated with colonialism or with imperialism,
(since neither function is static), but that change in
cartographic usage will occur in the transition from
62 JEFFREY C. STONE
the one political status to the other by virtue of
differing functions.
portion of its effort in Africa to former British
Latterly, DOS was devoting a decreasing proterritories
with programmes of work or training
provision for Ethiopia, Liberia, Chad and Madagascar
Imperialism, colonialism and cartography 63
(Directorate of Overseas Surveys, 1985). Not only
was a more internationalist attitude to Africa
becoming apparent, but with the responsibilities of
the Directorate now transferred to the Ordnance
Survey’s Overseas Surveys Directorate and with
much overseas work to be transferred to the private
sector (McGrath, 1982) we may see commercial firms
perhaps from several European countries working
under Ordnance Survey and Overseas Development
Agency supervision, thus restoring the commercial
and international dimensions of European cartography
in Africa which were associated with
seventeenth and eighteenth century imperialism.
Recent writing (e.g., Griffiths, 1986; Either, 1986)
still does not always accept that the delegates to
the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 ‘were not talking
about partitioning Africa’ (Hargreaves, 1984, p. 17)
and that it was a last-ditch attempt to sustain Europe’s
traditionally internationalist approach of common
access to Africa. Nevertheless, differentiation
between the historical continuity of the imperialist
mercantile ethic which was still on display in Berlin a
century ago and its brief demise in direct colonial rule
provides a framework for challenging long-standing
Interpretations of pre-colonial cartographic evolution
and for appreciating the prime characteristics of
colonial surveys. It also provides a stimulus to further
work on colonial cartography, in the form of a
hypothesis which envisages disparate and comparatively
uncoordinated activity across seven shortlived
spheres of European rule. Although brief, it was
an important phase of map making, since it perforce
provided the bases for both the cadastral and the
topographic surveys of the independent nations of
Africa, who are now restored to a more indirect, if not
Imperial relationship with Europe.

The New Imperialism
From a world history perspective, the most noticeable trend in the history of the
late 19th century was the domination of Europeans over NonEuropeans.
This domination
took many forms ranging from economic penetration to outright annexation. No area of
the globe, however remote from Europe, was free of European merchants, adventurers,
explorers or western missionaries. Was colonialism good for either the imperialist or the
peoples of the globe who found themselves subjects of one empire or another? A few
decades ago, the answer would have been a resounding no. Now, in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the more or less widespread discrediting of Marxist and
Leninist analysis, and the end of the Cold War, political scientists and historians seem
willing to take a more positive look at Nineteenth Century Imperialism.
One noted current historian, Niall Ferguson has argued that the British Empire
probably accomplished more positive good for the world than the last generation of
historians, poisoned by Marxism, could or would concede. Ferguson has argued that the
British Empire was a “liberal” empire that upheld international law, kept the seas open and
free, and ultimately benefited everyone by ensuring the free flow of trade. In other words,
Ferguson would find little reason to contradict the young Winston Churchill’s assertion
that the aim of British imperialism was to:
give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to
strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to place the
earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their
capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain. (Ikenberry, p. 149)
It should come as no surprise that Ferguson regards the United States current position in
the world as the natural successor to the British Empire and that the greatest danger the
U.S. represents is that the world will not get enough American Imperialism because U.S.
leaders often have short attention spans and tend to pull back troops when intervention
becomes unpopular. It will be very interesting to check back into the debate on
Imperialism about ten years from now and see how Niall Ferguson’s point of view has
fared!
The other great school of thought about Imperialism is, of course, Marxist. For
example, Marxist historians like E.J. Hobsbawm argue that if we look at the l9th century
as a great competition for the world's wealth and resources, there were clear winners and
losers. Among the winners were the British, French, Americans, and Japanese—all
successful colonizers. Among the losers were Punjabis, Zulus, Chinese, Egyptians, Crow,
Sioux and hundreds of other NonEuropean
tribes and ethnic groups. (Hobsbawm, Age
of Empire)
There are a couple of generalizations that need to be said about this process of European
expansion:
2
1. Much of it occurs during the last 30 years of the 19th century—it is during the years
1870 to 1900 that much of Africa and Asia falls under the direct control of one European
power or another. It should be remembered that the United States, in this context, is
clearly an economic and cultural outpost of Europe. Americans are enthusiastic players
in the Imperial sweepstakes; for the most part, at the expense of Spain. (Hence the term
New Imperialism!).
2. This whole period of colonialism and empire building is very intense but brief—for
example the whole period of acquiring colonies, exploiting colonies, and finally decolonization
roughly falls into one human lifetime: Winston Churchill, the noted British
Imperialist I quoted was born in 1870 and died in 1962. He grew to adulthood during the
height of the Imperialist craze, fought as a young man in the Sudan and South Africa,
and lived to supervise the dismantling of the British Empire.
The Great Debate
Given the later popularity of colonial expansion, it is surprising to see just how
futile colonies seemed before 1850. For example, Adam Smith had argued that the
burdens of colonialism outweighed its alleged benefits; liberal reformers favored laissez
faire economics and colonies tied to the mother country did not seem to fit the model of
global free trade. The liberal party leader William Gladstone expected the whole British
Empire to dissolve in the end, and in 1852 Benjamin Disraeli, who agreed with Gladstone
in little else, made his famous declaration that “These wretched colonies will all be
independent in a few years and are millstones around our necks.” The experience of the
Spanish in the Western Hemisphere seemed to suggest colonial empires were on the way
out. A series of revolutions overturned Spanish colonial rule from Mexico to Argentina.
There was a widespread feeling in Europe that colonies were more trouble than they were
worth and the sooner or later colonies would revolt and fight for independence. Between
1775 and 1875, owing to all the successful revolutions in North America and Latin
America, Europeans lost more territory than they acquired. (Spielvogel, p. 859)
But, rather suddenly, at the beginning of the 1870s, the British, French, and
German popular attitudes towards colonies changed radically. The British Tory Party
under Benjamin Disraeli adopted an imperialist platform and the “Little Englanders”—as
critics of the empire called themselves, lost both parliamentary seats and popular influence.
In 1876 Disraeli persuaded parliament to bestow the title of “Empress of India” upon
Queen Victoria. The Queen appeared in public for the first time in 15 years adorned in
huge, uncut jewels from India. The British Crown and the empire were tied together in a
great outburst of enthusiasm for the British Empire. For two generations of British
subjects, India became “the Jewell in the Crown.” India became a symbol of exotic climes,
healthy and profitable adventure, and British Imperial greatness. Authors like Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle and Rudyard Kipling (1865 1936)
began to write popular tales of
adventures on the frontier: Gunga Din
3
Now in India’s sunny clime,
Where I used to spend my time
Aservin'
of 'Er Majesty the Queen.
Of all them blackfaced crew
The finest man I knew
Was our regimental bhisti, Gunga Din.
So I'll meet him later on
At the place where 'e is gone Where
it's always double drill and no canteen
'E'll be squatin' on the coals
Givin' drink to poor damned souls,
An' I'll get a swig in Hell from Gunga Din!
Though I've belted you and flayed you,
By the livin' Gawd that made you,
Your a better man than I am GungaDin!
The popularity of imperialism was simply one superficial explanation for a remarkable
process of colonial expansion. In the year 1800, Europeans controlled or occupied 35%
of the land surface of the globe; by 1878 this figure had risen to 67% and by 1914 to
over 84%. Between 1870 and 1900 alone, about 1/4 of the land surface of the world was
divided up among the colonial powers of Europe.
Two questions come to mind: How was all this possible? And most of all,
Why?
The "How" part of the question is easy enough to answer. Europeans enjoyed a
decisive technological and military advantage. Many famous colonial fights were literally
battles matching 12th century weaponry against the most modern weaponry that European
science could produce: rifled percussion muskets, later on, breech loading repeaters,
Gatling guns, maxim machine guns and powerful field artillery. Indigenous peoples, be
they Sioux at Wounded Knee, Zulus at Rourke's drift, or Sudanese Dervishes at
Omdurman stood no chance against vastly superior firepower. Even vast spaces and the
interior of the American or African continents gave little shelter since European armies
built their railways as they came or relied on steampowered
riverboats with light, cannon
to push their way up the Yangste, or the Congo, or the Nile. In 1842, one British
steamboat, the H.M.S. Nemesis sank most of the Naval forces of the Emperor of China in
one afternoon. Only extremely warlike peoples like the Afghanis or the Ethiopians,
sheltered among their inhospitable hills blunted the drive of Western imperialists. The
Ethiopians defeated a large army of Italians at Adowa in 1895, and neither the British
during the 1880s nor the Soviets during the 1980s, had much luck in subduing the
Afghans. As for the United States today, who knows?
Perhaps the greatest display of western military superiority came in the Egyptian
Sudan, at the battle of Omdurman (1898) when in one morning the Maxims and Lee4
Enfield rifles of Lord Kitchener's army killed 11,000 dervishes for the loss of 48 of their
own British regulars. Young Winston Churchill was there and participated in the last
successful Cavalry charge in British history. Battles like Omdurman demonstrated that the
West enjoyed a military superiority equivalent to the productive and economic domination
their factories and technology gave them. The global dominance of the West, implicit since
the days of Christopher Columbus now knew few limits. Great Britain ruled India and
fought several border wars in Pakistan and Afghanistan with a few volunteer regiments—a
force of only 75,000 European troops. Between 1870 and 1914, the best defense native
people enjoyed against European military superiority was the limited protection of very
inhospitable climates and the susceptibility of Europeans to tropical diseases like Yellow
Fever and Malaria.
The “Why” question is far more difficult to answer.
Economic Theories of Imperialism: Hobson and Lenin
A famous British economist, J. A. Hobsonand
following him, Lenin, attributed the
colonial expansions of these years to special new economic forces at work in the most
industrialized nations of western and central Europe. This economic explanation of the
urge to imperialism is usually taken to mean that the basic motives were also the basest
motives and that, whatever political, religious, or more idealistic excuses might be made,
the real impulse was always one of capitalistic greed for raw materials, advantageous
markets, good investments, and fresh fields of exploitation. The argument, in brief, is that
what Hobson called '”the economic taproot of imperialism” was excessive capital in search
of investment, and that this excessive capital came from over saving made possible by the
unequal distribution of wealth. The remedy, he maintained, was internal social reform and
a more equal distribution of wealth. “If the consuming public in this country raised its
standard of consumption to keep pace with every rise of productive powers, there could
be no excess of goods or capital clamorous to use imperialism in order to find markets.”
It is undeniable that the search for lucrative yet secure overseas investment played a part in
the European urge to acquire colonies at the end of the nineteenth century.
Lenin and “Capitalist Imperialism”
The followers of Karl Marx were especially eager to prove that imperialism was
economically motivated because they associated imperialism with the ultimate demise of
capitalism. V .I. Lenin (18701924)
elaborated the argument, in his famous pamphlet
“Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism”(1916). According to Lenin, as the capitalist
system concentrates wealth in fewer and fewer hands, the possibility for investment at
home is exhausted, and capitalists have not choice but to invest abroad, establish colonies,
and exploit small, weak nations. In the backward colonial peoples, argued Lenin,
capitalism had found a new proletariat to exploit; and from the enhanced profits of such
imperialism it was able to bribe at least the more skilled workers at home into renouncing
revolutionary fervor and collaborating with the bourgeoisie. There could be no cure for
imperialism aside from the destruction of capitalism. At the same time, the destruction of
5
colonial empires must be intimately involved with the great, inevitable revolution against
capitalism itself. Cecil Rhodes, the founder of the Rhodes scholarships and a leading
British imperialist, seemingly agreeing with Lenin, argued that colonies helped to ensure
social peace and prevented socialist revolution at home by taking the minds of the working
class off their misery: “He who would avoid civil war must be an imperialist.”
Great Power Rivalries and Navalism
Today, few historians or economists take the simplifications of Lenin very
seriously. For one thing, colonies were not a major source of investment. The British, the
foremost colonizers of all, invested far more capital in North America, South America and
Australia rather than in Africa, India or China. Many colonies acquired were economically
useless—British New Guinea or the German Cameroons offered little economic incentive
to European countries. It was not so much a matter of investment following annexation as
the other way around. The Germans invested far more money in Latin American than in
their own African colonies. This is not that there no economic advantages from colonies.
The British got gold, copper, and rare minerals from South Africa. The Belgians made
efforts to exploit the mineral resources of the Congo, but there is no denying the fact that
most of the new colonies cost more than they returned to the mother country.
There is a better explanation for l9th century Imperialism that still has its roots in
the world economic structure. This explanation stresses the importance of the unification
of Germany in 1870 and the emergence of the new German Reich as a major economic
and military factor. During the late 19th century tensions between the great powers of
Europe increased; more to the point, there was a military component to all this in the form
of a military and naval arms race. It became more convenient to play out the European
rivalries in the colonial sphere that at home in the form of open warfare. At the same time,
as war in Europe began to seem more likely, all governments became more interested in
dominating strategic territories and favorable locations for military and naval bases.
Suddenly the Cape of Africa and the coastal cities of China seemed to be of enormous
strategic significance. The British government in particular began to see the British Empire
more in terms of a possible strategic asset in case of war. Colonial outposts like Gibraltar,
the Suez Canal, and Hong Kong all become more important as military and naval bases
than as symbols of empire. They were now vital as links in the strategic lifeline to India.
In short, European nations acquired colonies for reason of national security, because
empire was very popular with the voters, and because governments came to see colonies
as necessary to great power status.
Nationalist intellectuals in all European powers argued that national greatness
meant seizing colonial territory. Once the scramble for colonies began, failure to enter the
race was perceived as a sign of weakness, totally unacceptable to an aspiring great power.
Imperialists like Joseph Chamberlain in Britain, Conservative Party Colonial Secretary,
argued that the empire also provided a training ground for new leaders and a great
economic unit should a collision with Germany come. The German historian Heinrich von
Treitschke, for example, maintained that “all great nations in the fullness of their strength
have desired to set their mark upon barbarian land and those who fail to participate in
6
this rivalry will play a pitiable role in time to come.” (Spielvogel, p. 859) The French
political scientist Paul Leroy Beaulieu justified French expansion in Africa because:
Colonies are a matter of life or death for France: either France will become a great
African power or in a century or two she will be no more than a secondary
European power and will count for as much in the world as Greece or Rumania.
For all these reasons, by the end of the l9th century colonialism like nationalism developed
into a mass cult. Colonies were symbols of national greatness and nationalists of every
economic class were proud of them.
The very symbol of imperialism was the modern, armored, steampowered
warship. If a great power by definition, possessed colonies, she protected those colonies
by building a modern fleet. Great Britain had always relied on her Royal Navy and by the
1890s many countries decided to follow the British example and invest in a fleet of steel
battleships. In the new German Empire, in particular, the new German Emperor William
II (18691941)
envied British world power, which he believed rested on her navy. He
determined that Germany must have its fleet as well:
Germany is a young and growing Empire. She has a worldwide
commerce to
which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds.
Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her interests in
even the most distant seas. Only those powers which have great navies will be
listened to with respect, when the future of Pacific comes to be solved; and if for
that reason only, Germany must have a powerful fleet. (Daily Telegraph Affair,
10/28/1908)
Political, Religious, and Cultural Justifications
Of course Europeans generally preferred to invoke other justifications for empire.
Most argued that colonialism benefited indigenous peoples by bringing them the benefits
of higher civilization. King Leopold of Belgium rushed enthusiastically into the race for
territory in Central Africa: “To open to civilization the only part of the globe where it has
not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which envelops whole populations, is a Crusade
worthy of this century of progress.” (Spielvogel, p. 863) President McKinley justified
intervention in the revolt of the Philippines against Spain because, “We must help our little
brown brothers.” The story goes that the President then had to have someone help him
find the Philippine islands on the Oval Office globe. Some imperialist took a more
religioushumanitarian
approach to empire. They argued that Europeans (and Americans)
had a Christian and moral responsibility to educated ignorant peoples into higher culture
and Christianity. To many Europeans and Americans, the prospect of saving souls seemed
as important as the prospect of expanding prestige and profit. The humanitarian argument
found its classic expression in Kipling's famous poem, The White Man's Burden:
7
Take up the White Man's Burden,
Send forth the best ye breed.
Go bind your sons to exile,
To serve your captive's needs;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild,
Your newcaught
sullen peoples,
Half –devil and half –child.
If Kipling’s idealistic view of British Imperialism is obvious, so too is his arrogant
assumption of White supremacy.
Imperialism and Social Darwinism
Imperialism was also tied to the growth of racist and Social Darwinist thought.
Social Darwinists believed that in the struggle between races and nations, the fittest are
victorious and survive. Superior races must inevitably dominate inferior races by military
force to show how strong and virile they are. As one British academic put it in 1900:
“The path of progress is strewn with the wrecks of nations; traces everywhere to be seen
of the [slaughtered remains] of inferior races ....Yet these dead people are, in very truth,
the stepping stones on which mankind has arisen to the higher intellectual and deeper
emotional life of today.” (Spielvogel, p. 859) Another English imperialist was equally
blunt: “To the development of the White Man, the Black Man and the Yellow must ever
remain inferior.” (Spielvogel, p. 859) Europeans of all imperialist nations readily
accepted the racist notion of the superiority of the Christian west; German imperialists
spoke of the greatness of German Kultur while French colonialists discussed the “French
civilizing Mission.” Many felt that missionary activity alone was a sufficient justification in
itself. In India, the sons of Brahmin families were taught British history and Shakespeare
but forbidden membership in White society. One textbook written to educate Vietnamese
children in French history began with these words: “Our ancestors, the Gauls, were a fairhaired
race.”
To return to our opening argument, there were more than a few material benefits
for the colonial peoples. It was the British Navy that abolished the international slave
trade. This alone might be considered justification enough for the British Empire by many
evangelicals at home. There were other benefits too. For example, European medicine
cured or at least controlled ancient epidemic diseases like Yellow Fever. On the other
hand, such medical interventions also upset the delicate environmental demographic
balance and contributed to a global population explosion that is still underway. Europeans
built railways and modernized harbor facilities. Colonial peoples received European style
educations and a lucky few even entered Oxford and Cambridge or the Sorbonne. A lot of
impressive buildings were erected to house European governors and the bureaucrats who
administered the colonies. Naval bases, military bases, coaling stations and mining towns
appeared in the jungles of the Congo. Cities like Saigon and Cairo acquired broad
European style avenues and impressive restaurants, opera houses and department stores.
Nevertheless, the belief that the superiority of their civilization obligated them to impose
8
modern industry, cities and new medicines on supposedly primitive peoples was another
form of racism.
The British and Egypt: The Classic Pattern
The classic pattern of European intervention can be illustrated by the experience of
Egypt during the 1870s and 1880s. French and British banks made several large scale
loans to the ruler of Egypt, the Khedive. The French formed a company under the control
of the engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps to dig the Suez Canal linking the Mediterranean and
the Red Seas. Whether in the form of loans to the local ruler or in the form of investments,
large amounts of British and French capital began pouring into Egypt. The Khedive, eager
to impress everyone with his progressive plans, built the world's largest opera house in
Cairo and hired the great Italian composer Guisepe Verdi to write and produce a new
opera, Aida. At the same time, British capital flowed into the Egyptian countryside to
encourage the production of raw cotton to replace the cotton produced by the plantations
of the American South recently shut down by the Union forces in the American Civil War.
Within a few years, inevitably, Egypt fell behind in its repayment schedule to
French and British banks. The consortium building the Suez Canal went bankrupt and the
British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli arranged a massive loan to buy the Suez Canal
out from under the French government. Disraeli's scheme worked and the British acquired
the Suez Canal. “You have it Ma'am,” he reported to Queen Victoria at Windsor palace.
At the same time, also inevitably, the British financial community exerted pressure on
Parliament to protect British interests even to the point of military intervention.
Faced with these kinds of political pressures, and with the press for a more forceful
policy, all British governments, conservative and liberal alike, often gave way and
authorized ever more intrusive interventions in Egypt. In 1876 a British Naval Squadron
bombarded Alexandria and landed Royal Marines although the British did not remove the
Khedive. In fact, local rulers were part of the imperialist system. The British navy and
civilian administrators thus ensured repayment to British banks by seizing one half the
customs revenues of the Egyptian government.
To protect their legitimate “interests,” the British sent ever more administrators,
soldiers and engineers to Egypt. Every step along the way British politicians did so
reluctantly, but they did it anyway until matters reached the point where the British
government controlled the economy of Egypt more thoroughly than that of Canada or
Australia. In this way, gradually but inexorably, Egypt lost its independence. This
scenario, economic penetration followed by gunboat diplomacy, was followed in dozens of
countries in the Third World. In the words of one of my old professors, from Dublin to
Calcutta, the world is full of people who do not mourn the passing of the British Empire.
(T.A. Brady, Jr.)