Pakistan and Seato

Pakistan and SEATO
Dr. Lubna Saif*
This paper seeks to investigate why Pakistan became a member of
South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it was not part of
South East Asia. By joining SEATO, Pakistan became an ally of the
American Power System in Cold War against Communism. This
strategic partnership strengthened non-democratic forces in Pakistan
eroding the fragile democratic institutions and established a
“constitutional dictatorship” which was used as a vehicle for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO.
Cold War and American Power System
The year 1946 is marked with the Cold War demonstrations when
Harry Truman declared that “no more recognition of communist
governments” and “I am sick of babying the Soviets”.1 Under the
influence of his advisors, especially George Marshall, Truman supported
their hard-line advice and policies against the Soviet Union. By 1947
these policies came to be known as “containment”. George Kennan
became the “father of containment” with his “long telegram” of February
22.2 Kennan’s depiction of communism as a “malignant parasite” that
had to be contained by all possible measures, became the ideological
foundation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and National Security
Act of 1947. In his inaugural address of 20 January 1949, Truman
declared four points about his “program for peace and freedom”: to
support the UN, the European Recovery Program, the collective defence
of the North Atlantic region, and a “bold new program” for technical aid
* Chairperson, Department of Pakistan Studies, Allama Iqbal Open University,
Islamabad.
1 Harry Truman to James Byrnes, 5 June 1946. Cold War Policies, Retrieved, 21
December 02. http://history.sandiego.edu. /truman46.html.
2 See, Thomas Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (New York, 1988).
78 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
to the poor nations.3 It was believed that because of his programs, “the
future of mankind would be assured in a world of justice, harmony and
peace”.4 Thus the containment was not only a policy, rather it was a way
of life. The probable fission bomb capacity of the Soviet Union greatly
intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States, which
culminated in NSC 68.5 Fearing the threat of Soviet atomic capabilities,
it was felt that the US programs and plans were dangerously inadequate
in terms of timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress towards
the attainment of the United States’ political, economic, and military
objectives. It was argued that the “continuation of …[present] trends
would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative
to the Soviet Union and its satellites…These trends lead in the direction
of isolation not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis
for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.”6 The
Europe was defeated and US became the “centre of power in the free
world”. This was reflected in the conclusion, which stated, “we must
organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a
positive program for peace which [would] frustrate the Kremlin design
for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which
the Kremlin… [would] be compelled to adjust”.7 It was believed that
without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, the free world
would have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until they
discover one day that they had sacrificed positions of vital interest.8 To
secure these “positions of vital interest”, a much more “rapid and
concerted build-up of the actual strength” of both the United States and
the other nations of the free world was suggested in the analysis. The
program envisaged “the political and economic measure with which and
the military shield behind which the free world [could] work to frustrate
the Kremlin design by the strategy of the Cold War”.9 Avoiding the
direct war with the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conceived with the
aim to frustrate “the Kremlin’s design by the steady development of the
moral and material strength by the free world and its projection into the
3 Cold War Policies. Retrieved, 21 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/20th /truman46.html.
4 Ibid.
5 Cold War Policies. Retrieved 19 December 02 http://history.sandiego.edu.
/gen/1950s/nsc68.html.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 79
Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the
Soviet system.”10 The conclusion summarized that “by means of a rapid
and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of
the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest
the initiative from the Soviet Union”, the USA would be in a position to
“confront with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of
the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its
will”.11 It was thought that ‘such evidence [was] the only means short of
war, which eventually [might] force the Kremlin to abandon its [existing]
course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of
major importance”.12
The election of 1952 in the U.S. brought former Allied Commander
Dwight Eisenhower to the White House, who chose John Foster Dulles
as his Secretary of State. Together, Eisenhower and Dulles further
modified the Containment Doctrine as articulated in NSC-68. With
Eisenhower in office, the U.S. Defence Policy took a more offensive
“New Look”. His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “a patrician,
visceral anticommunist closely tied to the nation’s financial
establishment, was obsessed with communism’s challenge to the U.S.
corporate power in the Third World.”13 Dulles criticized the foreign
policy of Truman and argued that the policy of “containment” should be
replaced by a policy of “liberation”. Dulles considered neutrality as an
obsolete and an immoral and shortsighted conception. Alliances such as
NATO were the part of his “liberation strategy”.
Cold War, Defence Pacts and Pakistan
For American policy makers, the Cold War was in fact a real war in
which the survival of the free world was at stake and Pakistan before its
birth was destined to enter into this war. Pakistan’s proximity to the
Soviet Union and China, the emerging Communist Block and the Middle
East and Iran the centre of oil resources or “wells of power” placed it in a
very critical position on the “security map of the free world”. The key
event in the South Asian arena of Cold War competition was the signing
of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the
United States on 19 May 1954 with the major objective to build defence
establishment in Pakistan to be used to block any Soviet thrust into the
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 ‘Cold War (1953-1962)’ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 26 June
2004. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cold_war.
80 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
crucial Middle East and provide United States with valuable military
bases against Soviet Union. The Mutual Defence Agreement resulted in
Pakistan’s signing the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact also referred to as
the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO). The SEATO was
established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila
Pact), which was signed at Manila in September 1954. The SEATO
became effective on 19 February 1955 and was signed by Pakistan,
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand
and the United States. Pakistan was included in the alliance though it was
not a part of South East Asia.
By signing these Defence pacts, Pakistan became one of the first
few allies of the American Power System in its war against Communism
in an environment when most of the Third World countries were
campaigning for nationalism, social reformism and anti-imperialism and
refused to be part of the American Power System in the Cold War era.
Dulles is known in history for his efforts to “integrate the entire
noncommunist Third World into a system of mutual defence pacts,
travelling almost 500,000 miles in order to cement new alliances that
were modelled after (NATO)”.14 The emphasis on pacts was a logical
culmination of Truman-Acheson containment, which called for strong
alliance systems directed by the U.S. and collective security pacts.
Dulles, along-with most U.S. foreign policy-makers of the era, failed to
distinguish indigenous Third World social revolutionaries and
nationalists from the Soviet influence. Neutrality for Dulles was “an
obsolete, immoral and short-sighted conception”.15
In its war against Communism, Dulles found cooperative partnersgenerals
and bureaucrats who were trained by the British colonial
strategist minds believing in a concept of a security state and groomed in
a colonial tradition of “controlled democracy”. They were put in control
of affairs at the expense of the democratic institutions to steer Pakistan
towards Dulles’s collective security pacts. In April 1953 the Governor-
General destroying the notion of the cabinet government dismissed the
Prime Minister Nazimuddin to pave the way for negotiating the Mutual
Defence Agreement under an “authoritarian regime” which was
unaccountable to the people of Pakistan and backed by the army. This
authoritarian regime led by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad was
again successful in dismissing the provincial government of East
Pakistan in May 1954 when it voiced against the signing of the Mutual
14 ‘Dulles’, Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 81
Defence Agreement. An authoritarian regime under the disguise of a
democratic set up was felt necessary to influence Pakistan to join the
Defence Pacts, SEATO and Baghdad Pact, since the majority of the
parliamentarians and the people of Pakistan were not in favour of joining
these defence pacts. The fear of widespread public protest over the
question of Pakistan’s joining these defence pacts and support of Soviet
Union for any such popular movement was keeping Pakistan’s
authoritarian regime in a dilemma to publicly announce its intentions to
join any defence pact against Communism.
Pakistan’s Forced Entry into the SEATO
In the following discussion, we will examine how Pakistan was
persuaded to join SEATO. Dulles initiated the SEATO as a security
arrangement for the region of Southeast Asia. The idea was publicly
discussed in Geneva Peace Conference in May 1954 in the aftermath of
Indo-China conflict. On July 24, 1954, presenting his “Five Point
Program on South-East Asia and Europe”, Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of
State highlighted following points:
First. As an interim protection, to fill what is clearly a dangerous vacuum
in South-East Asia, there should be a prompt declaration of intention on
the part of all the free nations, including the so-called neutralist block,
against further aggression by means of external invasion or internal
penetration. Second. Simultaneously, every effort should be made to move
ahead on the longer range of hard and fast military commitments under a
South-East Asia defence pact. With all the many Asiatic powers we would
like to see join such a pact may not be willing to enter it that should not
serve as a veto on all the others.16
During the Geneva Peace Conference, the Foreign Office, London
was informed that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to
join in a pact for the defence of South-East Asia and that Burma had
refused.17 Following the Geneva Conference, the joint United Kingdom-
United States Study Group on South-East Asia agreed upon “collective
security pact and declaration of intention.”18 It was recorded that the
United States had agreed that “invitations should be issued by 7 August
for a meeting at the beginning of September to draw up a treaty”. It was
further recorded that “an approach should now be made to the Colombo
16 Extract from Pages 11288-9 of Congressional Record, 24 July 1954, Foreign Office
[henceforth FO] 371/111875, The National Archives: Public Record Office
[henceforth TNA: PRO].
17 Geneva to FO, 17 May 1954, D 1074/10, FO 371/111862, TNA: PRO.
18 FO Minute, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
82 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Powers to urge their participation in talks on the treaty”. Earlier, the State
Department informed all the U.S. embassies in Asia on 24 July 1954 that
an agreement had been reached between America and Britain to hold a
conference on Southeast Asian defence as the first step. The diplomatic
missions were also told that the British Government was assigned the
responsibility to invite the governments of Australia, New Zealand,
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of participating
in establishing a collective security agreement in South-East Asia.19 On
30 July 1954, Commonwealth Relations Office, London sent a telegram
to its high commissioners in India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa which stated that “the
Foreign Secretary [had] undertaken that invitation should be issued not
later than 7 August to the Conference to be held not later than 1st
September to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a Collective
Defence Agreement”.20 To make an immediate approach to Colombo
Powers, a telegram containing the text of a message from the Foreign
Secretary to the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon was sent
by the Commonwealth Relations Office, London on the same day. A
similar message was sent to the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia.
In the telegram the fears were expressed that the Indian reaction to the
approach was bound to be negative, therefore, it was considered
important “to ensure that Nehru’s reaction should be as favourable as
possible”. It was hoped that positive reaction from Pakistan, Ceylon and
Burma would “exercise a moderating influence on Nehru”. The
Commonwealth Relations Office was “cognizant of the difficulties vis-àvis
India, if Pakistan were to go it alone without the support of any other
Colombo Power, but there [could] be no question of our dissuading
either Pakistan or Ceylon from joining”. The Commonwealth Relations
Office conveyed to high commissioners that they were “indeed most
anxious to have the support of any Asian country or countries, other than
Siam and the Philippines that [could] be persuaded to join or to be
associated with the organization”. In his message the British Foreign
Secretary, invited the Prime Ministers of Colombo Power by informing
that:
We have long been in favour of creating a broadly based defensive
organization in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. After careful
study of this problem, our ideas have now crystallized sufficiently for me
19 Laithwaite to CRO, 23 July 1954, D 1074/271, FO 371/111873, TNA: PRO.
20 Telegram no. 334, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
Pakistan and SEATO 83
to seek your views on them, and I hope you will give them very serious
consideration.21
The Foreign Secretary in his message expressed the hope “to see the
Asian powers play a leading role in the defence of South-East Asia”.
Emphasizing the importance of the area, he was of the view that “its
peace [was] as yet so insecure, that [they felt it] vital to safeguard its
peaceful development and ensure its stability”. The purpose of the
meeting was “to consider possible measures of collective defence for
South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific in the hope of producing
agreed recommendations for consideration by the participating
governments and a draft collective defence agreement”. Three specific
subjects to be considered at the meeting were: “a) measure of military,
economic or technical assistance to countries wishing to strengthen their
resistance to external interference of any kind; b) consultation with a
view to common action, should the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area,
be endangered; c) action in the event of overt aggression”.22 The treaty
was said to be discussed with Chou En-lai in Geneva and the Chinese
were reported to be “well aware that [Anglo-American block] intende[d]
to press forward on these lines”. It was informed that “during these
discussions Chou En-lai was mainly concerned to obtain assurances
about the neutrality of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam”. It was made clear
that these countries were not going to “be the members of the proposed
organization”.23
The news that Pakistan had decided to participate in the conference
on South-East Asia defence was received with great pleasure and
considered “an excellent development”.24 Although, Pakistan had
decided to participate in the Manila Treaty Conference, she was not yet
ready to become a member of the South-East Asia Organization. The
message of Mohammad Ali Bogra stated:
My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret personal
message of 30 July. I am glad to be able to inform you that Pakistan will be
represented at the proposed meeting, which is planned for the beginning of
September to consider possible measures of collective defence for South-
East Asia and South West Asia. Our participation in the meeting does not
imply prior acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the
21 Telegram no. 335, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 FO Minute, 5 August 1954, D 1074/300, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
84 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
discussions in the meeting. Any recommendations made by the meeting
will be considered on their merits.25
On the other hand, Nehru’s reaction to the Manila Treaty
Conference as expected was very critical. Refusing to be associated with
any such proposed organization, Nehru argued that “an organization of
the kind proposed was more likely to promote mistrust and suspicion
than security”.26 He observed that “though it was called a defensive
arrangement it was by inference directed against China and was
motivated by fear about Chinese intentions”. He opined that any such
organization “would only serve to divide South and South-East Asia into
rival groups and would therefore, in his opinion largely undo much of the
great achievement of Geneva”. Nehru was seen convinced that “China
harboured no aggressive intentions” and there was no need for its
neighbours to feel threatened. This was not the view upheld by the
Anglo-American block, that professed that “China was the exponent of a
militant political philosophy to which [they] were unalterably opposed
and which by its very nature could scarcely allow weak neighbours to
develop freely along lines of their own choosing”.27 Criticizing the South
East Asian and South West Pacific Organization, Nehru asserted that “it
was far from being a collective peace system rather a military alliance”.28
Nehru warned that it would “possibly result in the formation of a
counter-military alliance”. He further argued that “the majority of Asian
countries [would] not be participating in the organization. Some would
even be strongly opposed to it, thus rendering South-East Asia a
potentially explosive theatre of the Cold War”.29
Nehru’s stand made it more essential that either Ceylon or Pakistan
should be persuaded to participate in the organization. It was more
convenient to press the authoritarian regime in Pakistan to bow before
the wishes of Dulles and his partners. In view of India’s criticism and
anticipated strong reactions from Moscow and Peking (Beijing), it was
easy for Pakistan’s pro-West leadership to offer unconditional support to
the proposed organization, a fact reflected in Mohammad Ali Bogra’s
message accepting the invitation to participate in the Manila Conference.
However, the governments of U.K. and U.S. were “anxious to secure
Pakistan’s participation or association with a South-East Asian
25 Laithwaite to CRO, 4 August 1954, D 1074/323, FO 371/ 111876, TNA: PRO.
26 Telegram No. 734, D 1074/303, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
27 Ibid.
28 Telegram No. 739, D 1074/303 (A), FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.
29 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 85
Organization even if she were the only Colombo Power”.30 It appeared
that there were some serious Anglo-American differences over the
strategy and control of a South East Asia Organization. It is interesting to
note that, how both the parties were exploiting Pakistan’s association for
gaining their specific interests. After knowing that Dulles had already
invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South-
East Asia, the Foreign Office, London and the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations were keen to show that they were more
“anxious” than the U.S. for Pakistan’s association hoping that “there
would be at least one Asian country to act as a counter-weight to the
American protégées-Siam and the Philippines”.31 It was argued that
“Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either
Siam [Thailand] or the Philippines”. The Foreign Office felt “if Pakistan
were excluded, it would be widely believed that [the British], rather than
the Americans, were responsible, and there would be a repetition of the
resentment towards the United Kingdom felt at the time of the
conclusion of the agreement with Turkey”. The fear was expressed that
the United States might prefer to dominate SEATO by excluding
Colombo Powers. Therefore, Pakistan’s association was considered
essential. To make their case more convincing, the Foreign Office,
London argued “if Pakistan were to come in now it would make it easier
for other Colombo Powers to come in later, e.g., Ceylon, Burma, and if
there [was] a victory of the Masjumi (Moslem Party) in the elections next
February [in] Indonesia.”32 To convince Pakistan to participate, it was
argued that “Pakistan’s interests in East Bengal give her a direct interest
in South-East Asian security”.33 According to American analysis, the
closeness of former East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South East
Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. It was
emphasized that it would be more difficult to justify the introduction of
American military equipment into East Pakistan, if Pakistan’s security
interests were primarily directed towards the Middle East.34
It was widely believed that “Foreign Minister [of Pakistan] by
signing the instrument in Manila had gone rather further than his
30 Pakistan and S.E.A.T.O. D 1074/300 (A), 29 July 1954, FO 371/111875, TNA:
PRO.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Allen to State Department, 28 July 1954, Telegram No. 118, 310 SEATO,
NDD.842430, RG 84, Box 42, File 350-Pak.Pol., National Archives USA,
Washington D.C.
86 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
Government had intended, and that there had been genuine
embarrassment between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
about something which the latter had done in order to be as cooperative
as possible with Mr. Dulles”.35 The Pakistan Ambassador was concerned
to maintain the “balance between tacit approval of South-East Asia
Treaty Organization and strict neutrality supported by fear of possible
Chinese reaction”.36 As expected, the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty provoked great criticism in Moscow and Peking.
Defending the Manila Treaty, the British Ambassador in Bangkok
observed in a press conference on 24 September 1954, that:
The propaganda attack against the treaty made by Moscow and Peking and
echoed by other communist agencies have been very violent. All have
denounced the Manila Treaty as “aggressive”. The falseness of this charge
and the fury with which it had been levelled show how effective it must
appear in communist eyes for the purpose for which it was designed,
namely the defence of South-East Asia against aggression. It should not be
forgotten that Chinese have their own treaty with the Soviet Union and
hence have no right to question whatever arrangement we may make with
our friends for our mutual defence.37
Despite the difficulties Pakistan could face over ratification of
SEATO, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was not given a sympathetic
hearing whenever he tried to explain Pakistan’s difficult position. The
minutes of such a meeting with the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence held in the Foreign Office London, reveal how the Prime
Minister’s position was humiliated rather showing an understanding
attitude for the difficult position in which Pakistan was being placed by
signing SEATO.38 It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra “haggled a
lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on the lines of
what “do we get out of it if we did become members, what about India
etc? The minutes recorded that “the Secretary of State and Minister of
Defence pressed Mohammad Ali Bogra strongly on loss of prestige and
other good reasons why it would be very short sighted of Pakistan to
back down now”.39 The record further reveals that “later the Foreign
Secretary and Lord Alexander had a further discussion with Mohammad
35 The Pakistan Ambassador told the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, A
letter by the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka to (Peterson) South-East Asia
Department Foreign Office, D 1074/693, FO 371/116933, TNA: PRO.
36 Ibid.
37 Bangkok to CRO, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
38 FO Minute, 30 September 1954, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.
39 Ibid.
Pakistan and SEATO 87
Ali Bogra when the latter said that he would like to think more about this
and have another meeting after he returned from Washington”.40
Bogra’s reluctance was due to the increasing pressure from the
Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly. These members opposed
to any Defence pact, were also in the process of finalizing the future
constitution of Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly was reconvened on
14 March 1954 after a long break of four months and had resumed the
work on the finalization of the remaining clauses of the Basic Principles
Committee Report. The Governor-General, who was in control of the
central executive but was unable to extend its authority over the
Constituent Assembly, was not pleased with these developments. Once
the constitution was framed, the Governor-General’s position was about
to change and the focus of the power had to shift to the representative
forces. In July, Sir Ivor Jennings arrived in Pakistan to assist in the
drafting of the constitution on the invitation of the Assembly’s
Constitutional Drafting Committee. On 15 September, Bogra announced
in the Assembly that, “he [was] grateful to God that at long last [they
had]… crossed the last hurdle in Pakistan”.41 On 20 September, the
Assembly abolished the Public and Representative Offices
Disqualification Act (PRODA), the most powerful executive weapon,
since it was passed during Liaquat’s ministry. The next day, the
Constituent Assembly amended the Government of India Act 1935,
which prevented the Governor-General from dismissing the cabinet,
which was made responsible to the National Assembly through this
amendment. “This was the move to make the government completely
dependent upon the Assembly and to prevent the repetition of the
exercise of the Governor-General’s power of intervention”.42 According
to the fifth Amendment only members of the Assembly were to be
selected as cabinet ministers and could continue to hold only as long as
they retained the confidence of the legislature and similarly the Prime
Minister was required to be a member of the Assembly at the time of his
appointment.43 Furthermore, the cabinet was decided to be collectively
responsible to the Assembly, and would be required to resign if any one
of its members lost the confidence of the Assembly. By making these
40 Ibid.
41 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.353-65.
42 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1957), p.105.
43 XVI CAD (Con.), p.251 Government of India (5th Amendment) Act, 1954,
amending Sections 9, 10, 10A, 10 B, and 17. Pakistan Times, 22 September 1954;
Dawn, 21 September 1954.
88 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
amendments, the Assembly declared its supremacy and its objective to
ensure that “formation and working of government” should be in
accordance with the “accepted principles and conventions” of a
parliamentary system of government”.44 With the caption, “Parliament
Made Supreme Body”, Dawn stated that “the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan yesterday laid down in clear and unambiguous terms that from
that day the supreme authority in the country shall be the Parliament”.45
On 21 September, the Assembly voted its approval of the
constitution in the form of the Basic Principles Committee Report as
amended.46 Out of 40 votes polled, 27 were in favour, 11 Hindu members
voted against and none of the members from the Punjab voted on the
constitution. The Assembly then was adjourned until 27 October,
concluding what was called a “historical session”.47 In contrast, this was
seen as “veritable coup” carried out by Bengali members of the assembly
backed by ‘some have-nots” of the Muslim League.48 The British High
Commissioner observed that “one result [of the constitutional changes
was] to bring a step nearer the possibility that the Army and the higher
Civil Services…[might] one day come to the conclusion that the
politicians have made such a mess that it is necessary for non-political
forces to take over”.49 This observation was the mirror image of the
thinking of the “neo-colonial powers”, who claimed to be the champions
of democracy and protectors of the “free world” but to secure their
strategic interests found justification in promoting the non-political and
non-democratic forces at the expense of derailing the democratic process
in Pakistan. “Pakistan’s international supporters were ambivalent about
democracy too. The American Agenda was clear: a pro-Western
Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic
Pakistan were all desirable, but in that order. When democracy
threatened to remove a leadership that was less than pro-America, the
U.S. Embassy conveyed this priority to Pakistanis”.50 Supported by these
protectors of the “free world”, the Governor General ordered the police
to bar the members of the Constituent Assembly from attending the
session of the Assembly on 27 October 1954 which was called
44 Keith Callard, p.107.
45 Dawn, Karachi, 22 September 1954.
46 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.499-510, 570-72.
47 Dawn, 22 September 1954.
48 Karachi to CRO, 30 September 1954, DO35/5135, TNA: PRO.
49 Ibid.
50 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.56.
Pakistan and SEATO 89
specifically to vote on the draft constitution approved in the Assembly’s
previous session.51 The next day, the Governor General dissolved the
Constituent Assembly, and appointed a ‘semi dictatorial executive”
praised as a “cabinet of talents”, in which the Army Chief, General
Muhammad Ayub was included as the Defence Minister. “From all
accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Muhammad’s plan to
dismiss the Constituent Assembly once for all and to start again was
worked out with General Ayub’s prior knowledge. It is, moreover,
probable that without the assurance of the Army’s support, Ghulam
Muhammad might have hesitated”.52 General Ayub’s inclusion in the
cabinet was the indication to suggest that “this was no time for nonesense”
53 and that there should be no doubt left that the Army was the
negotiating power in the state construction and the real partner in
Dulles’s defence strategic plans.
“On 28 October 1954, the Assembly, which until then had been an
operating political body and had produced a new constitution, became a
‘failure’. But it was the success not the failure, which brought about its
demise.”54 The termination of parliamentary democracy was not the
result of “failure” within the Assembly or defects in the new
constitutional changes as suggested by the British High Commissioner
and campaigned by the Governor General and his associates, rather the
strategic partnership with the American Power System that promoted
authoritarianism was the real culprit. It was declared that the electorate
was bound to act foolish, as they had done in the East Pakistan election
clearly. This was so because masses were illiterate and needed further
training in democratic institutions. The assertion was until that was
accomplished there would be a need of “controlled democracy”.
Governor General’s action of dissolving the Constituent Assembly got
the judicial legitimacy by the Federal Court’s theory of “Law of
Necessity” declaring “that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity
makes lawful”.55 The effect of this theory was that those in command of
coercive powers of the state had the right to suspend constitutional
government when and for however long they thought necessary. The
subsequent courts in Pakistan have retroactively cited the theory of Law
51 Ibid, p.60.
52 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p.41.
53 Ibid.
54 Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1996), p.218.
55 Stephen P. Cohen, p.58.
90 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)
of Necessity “to justify coups against civilian governments by generals
Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf”.56
The bureaucrat-military alliance with the support of their strategic
partners was successful in eroding the democratic institutions and
establishing a “constitutional dictatorship” in Pakistan. This
constitutional dictatorship was the vehicle to be used for ensuring
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO. “The interplay of domestic, regional
and international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the
institutional balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed
over politicians”.57
56 Ibid.
57 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political
Economy of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.193.

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